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We develop a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver
and a partially informed sender who is guilt-averse toward the receiver. The senders
cost of sending a particular message is endogenous, depending on the receivers
beliefs induced by this message rather than on its exogenous formulation. Such
preferences lead to the endogenous emergence of evasive communication in that
the sender types who prefer not to reveal their information to the receiver pool
with uninformed types rather than with types observing di¤erent information. As
a result, the receiver may prefer an equilibrium with a smaller amount of messages
used on the equilibrium path. Besides, dealing with an ex ante less informed sender
can be benecial to the receiver, while the sender himself may want to commit to a
smaller ex ante likelihood of being informed.
Keywords: guilt aversion, information transmission, experts, psychological game
theory.
JEL codes: D82, D83, D84, C72.
1 Introduction
Many settings involve monetary incentives for strategic misrepresentation of information
transmitted from an informed expert (e.g., a nancial advisor or a doctor) to an
uninformed customer (Anagol et al. 2017, Johnson and Rehavi 2016). Still, even in
the presence of such conict of interest, customers considerably rely on this service
in practice.1 Thereby, they rely also on the indirect costs arising for the expert from
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1
deceiving the customer, which may limit the scope of fraudulent advice. For example,
deception can lead to reputational loss (Bolton et al. 2007), reclamation costs (Inderst
and Ottaviani 2013), or psychological costs which arise from intrinsic concern for the
well-being of the other party (McGuire 2000, Kesternich et al. 2015).2 The present paper
theoretically examines the role of another behavioral motivation that enhances credibility
of communication under monetary conict of interest - namely, guilt aversion, i.e. a
preference to comply with the expectations of others (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007).3
In sum, we study the implications of guilt aversion for the structure of equilibrium
(cheap-talk) communication between a sender and a receiver under monetary conict of
interest. One of the key elements of the model is that the sender is uninformed with
some probability. This allows the sender to engage in strategic evasion, i.e. to (credibly)
pretend to be uninformed about the state of the world. We show that guilt aversion on
the side of the sender leads to the endogenous emergence of such evasive communication
in equilibrium. In turn, this has consequences for both playerswelfare as well as for their
preferences regarding the ex ante quality of the senders information.
Specically, in our model setting the sender observes the state of the world, which can
be either good or bad, with a certain probability, while with the remaining probability
he is uninformed. Then, the sender sends a message to the receiver out of an arbitrarily
large (countable) message space, or refrains from advice. Finally, the receiver must decide
between a riskless action (abstaining) and a risky action (investment), with the latter
having a positive payo¤ for her only in the good state.
The sender is biased to always induce investment independently from the state of
the world, while at the same time being sensitive to guilt toward the receiver (in the
main specication of the model). Guilt is determined by the discrepancy between the
receivers payo¤expectation conditional on the senders message and the ex post receivers
payo¤. The senders guilt sensitivity is unobservable to the receiver. Thus, the sender is
characterized by both the information that he has observed and his guilt sensitivity (the
latter referred to as the senders type).
There are only two qualitatively di¤erent equilibria in this game (while all other
existing equilibria are payo¤-equivalent to either of them). In the pooling equilibrium, the
sender types who induce investment send the same message, while all other types refrain
from advice. In the separating equilibrium, the sender types who induce investment after
observing the bad state of the world separate from the types observing the good state,
and send instead an "evasive" message pooling (exclusively) with uninformed types. The
evasive message leads to lower receivers beliefs than the message used in the pooling
2See Gneezy (2005), Sutter (2009), Lundquist et al. (2009), Erat and Gneezy (2012) and Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) for experimental evidence for aversion to lying.
3Guilt aversion has gained signicant empirical support in recent years. Experimental evidence is
documented in Guerra and Zizzo (2004), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Reuben et al. (2009),
Khalmetski et al. (2015), Khalmetski (2016) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017), among others. In
particular, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Khalmetski (2016) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017) show
the relevance of guilt aversion in the context of bilateral communication. Note that Ellingsen et al. (2010)
and Vanberg (2008) do not nd support for guilt aversion; see Khalmetski et al. (2015) for a possible
reconciliation.
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equilibrium, and hence is less costly for the sender in terms of expected guilt. Notably,
the separating equilibrium does not arise under purely outcome-based preferences, which
lead to the pooling equilibrium (while all other existing equilibria are payo¤-equivalent).
A shift from the pooling to the separating equilibrium can be both benecial and
detrimental to the receiver. In particular, the separating equilibrium provides the sender
with a psychologically cheap way to induce investment in the bad state of the world by
sending the evasive message. This tends to increase the rate of unprotable investment in
the bad state. At the same time, in the separating equilibrium the truly uninformed sender
types have lower expected guilt from inducing (ex ante protable) investment, which leads
to more e¢ cient receivers investment choices. This positive e¤ect dominates whenever
the monetary conict of interest between the sender and the receiver is su¢ ciently small.
We also consider the playerspreferences over the ex ante quality of the senders private
information. One of the results is that dealing with an (ex ante) less informed sender can
be preferable for the receiver. This occurs due to the fact that the ex ante probability that
the sender is uninformed a¤ects the receivers beliefs conditional on the message, and hence
the expected guilt of the sender. As a result, an (ex ante) more knowledgeable sender can
be, at the same time, more prone to inducing receivers response which is suboptimal for
the latter. Under certain parameter values, this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong to outweigh the
positive e¤ect of higher quality of the senders private information. Similarly, the sender
himself may want to ex ante commit to a smaller likelihood of being informed, since this
may reduce the receivers expectations conditional on his message, and hence result in
smaller guilt. Again, these e¤ects cannot be obtained under outcome-based preferences,
in which case both players are never worse o¤ if the sender is more likely to be informed.
Our study relates to several strands of literature. Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik
(2009) study message-based cost of lying, which depends only on how much the
exogenously given formulation of a message quantitatively deviates from the truth. While
such approach can address a broad range of situations (like reporting of company prots
to shareholders), there are limits to its applicability. First, it may occur that the states
of the world which are to be reported cannot be ranked quantitatively (e.g., possible
diagnoses of a patient), so that di¤erent possible lies cannot be compared by severity
based only on message formulations. Second, there are many ways in which the expert can
manipulate or mitigate explicit message formulations while conveying the same meaning
(e.g., euphemisms). In contrast, our approach based on guilt aversion provides a measure
of the cost of communication which can be applied in both of these cases: the di¤erence
between expectations induced by the advice and the actually realized outcome.4
Khalmetski et al. (2017) consider a structurally similar setting (both theoretically
and experimentally) where a sender, who may be either informed or uninformed about
a binary state of the world, sends a message to a risk averse receiver. They also
distinguish separating and pooling communication strategies (terming them as "evasive"
and "direct" lying, respectively), showing that senders may use evasion (i.e. pretending
4See Sobel (2018) for an analysis and discussion of belief-driven vs. message-driven measures of
distortion in the senders communication in sender-receiver games.
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to be uninformed) to sidestep higher psychological costs from outright lying. At the same
time, their model uses a reduced-form approach by exogenously assuming that the (xed)
intrinsic cost of evasive lying is lower than the cost of direct lying. In the current setting,
this basic feature of the model is derived endogenously, which allows for further theoretical
implications.
The role of guilt aversion in communication was studied by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017). However, in their settings, communication (in
particular, giving promises to behave in a certain way) serves e¤ectively as a commitment
device for a guilt-averse agent in games involving moral hazard. The current setting is
di¤erent in that communication resolves information asymmetry between the sender and
the receiver.
More relatedly, Loginova (2012) and Battigalli et al.(2013) consider communication
of private information with a guilt-averse sender. Loginova (2012) studies implications
of guilt aversion for the cheap-talk setting of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and nds that
higher guilt aversion of the sender allows for more informative communication. Battigalli
et al.(2013) show that guilt aversion can organize the experimental data in Gneezy (2005),
in particular, predicting that the sender is less likely to lie the larger is the discrepancy
in the receivers payo¤s between the possible outcomes. At the same time, in both of
these studies, the sender is always informed about the state of the world, so that there is
no scope for strategic pooling with uninformed types as a means to mitigate guilt, which
plays a central role in our model.5
The problem of strategic evasion has been analyzed thus far mainly in veriable
disclosure settings (Dye 1985, Dziuda 2011, Bhattacharya et al. 2018), where the sender
cannot misreport the observed information, but can only conceal it. Austen-Smith (1994)
studies evasive communication in a mixed setting, where an informed sender can choose
any message, while the uninformed sender cannot conceal the fact that he is uninformed
from the receiver. In contrast to these studies, we show that, once the sender has belief-
dependent preferences, a credible evasion can emerge even with completely unrestricted
communication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes existing equilibria. Section 4 studies the e¤ect of the senders ex ante
information quality on the welfare of both players. Section 5 presents nal discussion. All
proofs are in the online Appendix.
5A di¤erent type of belief-dependent preferences in the context of communication games - concern
for being believed to tell the truth - has been modeled in Abeler et al. (forthcoming), Dufwenberg and
Dufwenberg (2018), Gneezy et al. (2018) and Khalmetski and Sliwka (forthcoming).
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State G State B
as = ?; ar = I 0; P 0; c
as = ?; ar = A 0; 0 0; 0
as 2M; ar = I F; P F; c
as 2M; ar = A 0; 0 0; 0
Figure 1: Payo¤ matrix of Investment Game.
2 The model
2.1 Investment Game
We consider the following Investment Game. The game is between two players, the
sender (he) and the receiver (she). There are two possible states of the world  2 fG;Bg
(good and bad, respectively), each occurring with prior probability 1=2. The state of the
world is privately observed by the sender with probability  2 (0; 1). That is, there are
three possible states of sender information is 2 fG0; B0; N 0g (termed below as information
states), where G0 corresponds to observation of G, B0 to observation of B, and N 0 to no
information.6
The timing of the game is as follows. In stage 1 the sender chooses action as,7 which
can be either of the following:
- sending a message m to the receiver about the state of the world out of a countable
message space M with jM j  2 (we impose no other structure on the message space, i.e.
the exogenous formulation of the messages is completely irrelevant),
- refraining from giving advice (which is denoted by ?).
In stage 2, the receiver takes a binary action ar 2 fI; Ag (invest or abstain,
respectively) and the payo¤s are realized.
The monetary payo¤s are as follows. If the sender refrains from giving advice, his
payo¤ is always 0 independently of the receivers action and the state of the world. If
the sender sends a message, then he gets F if the receiver invests following his advice
(independently of the state of the world), and 0 otherwise. The receiver gets 0 if she
abstains from investment, and a state-contingent payo¤ () in case of investment such
that (G) = P and (B) = c. The payo¤ matrix is given in Figure 1.
Regarding the payo¤s, we assume:
1) F > 0: the sender prefers investment independently of the state of the world (in
case of sending a message);
2) P > 0; c < 0: the receiver prefers to invest only in the good state.
Thus, there is monetary conict of interest between the sender and the receiver in the
bad state of the world. In terms of applications, a nancial advisor can be, for instance,
monetarily biased toward recommending investment in a specic nancial product, which
allows him to receive a higher commission (independently of whether this product ts
6The main qualitative results are robust to adding more information states, e.g. if the sender (besides
being either fully informed or uninformed) can also obtain a noisy signal about the state of the world.
7Hereinafter, the upper index r refers to the receiver and s to the sender.
5
the receivers needs). In a similar way, a doctor can be incentivized by a pharmaceutical
company to prescribe its products to patients.
We also make the following additional assumption about the payo¤s.
Assumption 1 Investment is ex ante protable for the receiver, i.e. P >  c.
This restriction is necessary to generate evasive communication in equilibrium
(considered in Section 3.3.3). Otherwise, evasion, i.e. mimicking the uninformed types,
cannot induce investment.8
The assumption 0 <  < 1 is also crucial for our setting (to ensure the credibility
of evasive communication), and reects the fact that the sender might sometimes fail to
adequately address the receivers investment problem (while being aware of this fact).
For example, a doctor might not always be able to detect the true cause of a patients
symptoms (and hence, to recommend the right medical treatment), due to the complexity




Denote by ur(ar; ) the ex post utility of the receiver from action ar in state of the world
 . Her expected utility conditional on the senders action as and investment is:
Er[ur(I; )jas] = (as)P + (1  (as))c; (1)
where (as)  Prr[Gjas] is the receivers belief about the state of the world conditional on
the senders action as.9 If the sender sends message m, we call (m) the persuasiveness of
the message (in the sense of how persuasive is the message in inducing investment). The
receivers utility from abstaining, ur(A), is always 0 (see Figure 1). Thus, she prefers to
invest if and only if her expected utility from investment is larger than the utility from
abstaining, i.e.10
Er[ur(I; )jas] > 0
, (as) >  c
P   c  : (2)
2.2.2 Senders preferences
Outcome-based preferences. As a benchmark case, we consider purely outcome-based
preferences of the sender, i.e. when he cares solely about his and the receivers monetary
8In this case, the only equilibrium is the pooling equilibrium, considered in Section 3.3.2.
9Although formally this specication corresponds to risk neutrality, risk aversion does not qualitatively
change any of the subsequent results as far as investment is still ex ante protable.
10Thus, we assume that the receiver prefers abstaining over investment conditional on equal utility,
which is (essentially) without loss of generality for the subsequent results as far as only pure strategies
are considered.
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outcomes.11 In particular, assume that the sender has some xed cost  of incurring the
receivers losses, e.g., arising from inequality aversion or potential legal liability, which
he bears if the receiver gets a negative payo¤ of c.12 Then, the senders expected utility
conditional on investment can be represented in the following form:
U sis(; I) = F   Pr[Bjis]  ; (3)
where  is a sensitivity parameter, which is unknown to the receiver and uniformly
distributed on (0; ] (for consistency with the model of guilt aversion considered below).
The senders utility conditional on the receivers abstaining is 0 for all sender types, since
then the receiver does not incur losses. Besides, the sender is not deemed accountable for
the receivers losses if he refrains from advice, in which case the senders utility is equal
to his monetary payo¤ of 0 independently of the receivers action.
Guilt aversion. In the main specication of the model, the sender is assumed to be
guilt-averse, i.e. he dislikes to be responsible for disappointing the receivers expectations
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007).13 Such disappointment arises if the senders message
induces overly high expectations relative to the eventually realized outcome. Specically,
the receivers expectations induced by messagem are disappointed whenever her expected
utility (conditional on m) is higher than her ex post payo¤:
Dr(m; ar; ) = max f0; Er[ur(ar; )jm]  ur(ar; )g ; (4)
where Dr(m; ar; ) is the magnitude of disappointment.
Next, we assume that in case of sending message m, the expected guilt of the sender
in information state is is
Gsis(;m; a
r) = Es[Dr(m; ar; )jis]; (5)
where  is the senders sensitivity toward guilt. Finally, the total expected utility of the
sender in information state is in case of sending message m, denoted by U sis(;m; a
r), is
assumed to be additive in the monetary and guilt components:
U sis(;m; a
r) = F  1I  Gsis(;m; ar); (6)
where 1I is an indicator function, equal to 1 if the receiver invests and zero otherwise.
Note that Dr(m; ar; G) = 0 since the receiver cannot be disappointed by the highest
11This subsumes purely selsh preferences, when the sender does not care about the receivers payo¤, as
a special case. Under such preferences, the sender would always prefer to induce investment independently
of the state of the world.
12For simplicity, we assume that the sender has no change in utility if the receiver gets P , although
the equilibrium predictions remain qualitatively the same if the sender would be similarly a¤ected also
in this case. The only assumption that matters here is that the senders utility does not directly depend
on beliefs.
13This concept originates from psychological game theory, which presumes that utility can depend on
beliefs per se (Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009).
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possible outcome in the good state (i.e. Er[ur(ar; )jm]  P ). Consequently, the sender
expects non-zero guilt after sending message m and the receiver investing if and only if
the bad state of the world is realized, which implies
U sis(;m; I) = F   is(EsEr[ur(ar; )jm]  c); (7)
where is is the senders probability of the bad state conditional on is. If the receiver
abstains conditional on the message, then her outcome is no longer stochastic (being zero
in all states), so that Er[ur(A)jm] = ur(A) = 0; implying
Dr(m;A; ) = Gsis(;m;A) = U
s
is(;m;A) = 0: (8)
Hence, the sender never expects guilt if the receiver abstains following his message.
As in the case of the outcome-based preferences, the sender is not deemed (either
psychologically or legally) responsible for the receivers losses if he refrains from advice,
in which case the senders utility is 0 independently of the receivers action. Thus, the
sender always has an opportunity to completely avoid guilt by just refraining to provide
any advice to the receiver.
The senders guilt aversion coe¢ cient  is a random variable, unknown to the
receiver, distributed uniformly on an interval (0; ]. This assumption serves to reect
the uncertainty of the receiver about the trustworthiness of the sender, which is widely
heterogeneous in the population as documented by many experimental studies (e.g.,
Charness and Dufwenberg 2006).14 Hence, the sender is characterized by both the
information which he has observed is and his sensitivity to guilt . In what follows,
we refer to  as the senders "type".
Note that the communication costs dened in the current model may relate not only
to psychological guilt. The term Dr(m; ar; ), more generally, is supposed to reect
the receivers dissatisfaction with advice arising from her frustration from unfullled
expectations (induced by this advice). In turn, the receivers dissatisfaction with advice
can naturally lead to other costly consequences for the sender besides psychological costs,
for example, reputational losses. Naturally, our denition still leaves aside some other
aspects of communication costs, like aversion to induce a wrong decision of the receiver
with own advice (due to, for instance, altruistic concerns for the receiver). In particular,
by (8) the sender bears no costs if the receiver abstains, even if the sender knows that it is
a suboptimal decision. At the same time, it is plausible to assume that in many settings
the advisor is disciplined by the receivers perception of the quality of advice rather than
its actual quality.15 These are the settings which t our model and which are thus at the
14From a theoretical perspective, a su¢ ciently wide distribution of  makes the endogenous variables
of the model (e.g. the frequency of investment in a given information state) continuously depend on the
exogenous parameters, which in turn allows for richer implications in terms of comparative statics.
15In particular, it is plausible that in the corresponding real-life settings the receiver might not nd
out the actual state of the world if she abstains from investment. For instance, she might never realize
whether some innovative product ts her preferences unless she really tries the product.
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focus of the current analysis.16
Lexicographic preferences. The above specication of the receivers preferences implies
that the sender is always certain of the receivers investment conditional on m in
equilibrium if (m) >  (in which case the receiver prefers investment over abstaining).
However, one can think of a more general setting where the receivers likelihood of
investment varies more smoothly with respect to her beliefs conditional on m. This
would be the case, for instance, if the sender were unaware of the receivers exact degree
of risk aversion, which could take values on a su¢ ciently wide range. In such a case,
the likelihood of investment from the perspective of the sender would increase with (m)
(also if (m) goes beyond ). Then, a sender type preferring receivers investment over
abstaining would, all else equal, strictly prefer the message leading to the highest likelihood
of investment. While we omit a full modeling of this aspect for the sake of expositional
simplicity,17 it is reasonable to leave it in the model at least in the form of lexicographic
preferences.
Assumption 2 If two messages lead to investment and yield the same positive (negative)
expected utility for the sender, then he strictly prefers the message inducing a higher
(lower) receivers belief.
Note that under guilt aversion this assumption can e¤ectively apply only to types in
state G0 (who are certain that the state of the world is good, and hence experience no
guilt), while types in states B0 and N 0 will always strictly prefer one of several messages if
these messages induce investment while leading to di¤erent receivers beliefs (and hence,
di¤erent levels of expected guilt).
Besides, it is natural to assume that conditional on equal expected utility, the sender
prefers sending a message over completely refraining from advice (e.g., due to some
reputational concerns for being perceived as knowledgeable).
Assumption 3 If a message leads to the expected utility of 0, the sender strictly prefers
this message over refraining from advice.
2.3 Solution concept
The equilibrium outcome is characterized by
1. the strategy of the receiver r : fM;?g ! fI; Ag specifying whether to invest or
abstain conditional on each possible message and senders refrainment from advice;
16Note that we do not model any costs of lying stemming from the exogenous formulation of the
messages (i.e. their "literal" meaning). First, adding this additional layer of preferences would not
change the qualitative predictions of the model. Second, the main aim of our analysis is to disentangle
the e¤ects stemming purely from belief-driven communication costs, which motivates having such costs
as the only source of informativeness of communication in our model.
17See Khalmetski et al. (2017) where this property of the receivers investment is explicitly
incorporated into the analysis in a similar setting.
9
2. the strategy of the sender s : (0; ]  is ! fM;?g specifying whether to send a
particular message or refrain from advice for each sender type  and information
state is;
3. the receivers belief about the state of the world conditional on each senders action
(as);18
4. all higher-order beliefs about the state of the world conditional on each senders
action (for the analysis of guilt aversion).
We apply the solution concept of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which
implies that the senders and receivers equilibrium strategies should maximize the
respective expected utility functions given equilibrium beliefs; the receivers rst-order
beliefs are derived by Bayes rule whenever possible; higher-order beliefs are correct
(Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009).
We dene equilibria as payo¤-equivalent if the receiver and each sender type in each
information state have the same expected payo¤ (including the psychological payo¤)
between these equilibria. We dene an equilibrium where the receiver always invests




Let us consider general properties of all existing equilibria (under either guilt aversion or
outcome-based preferences). First, let us observe that at least one message must be sent
in any equilibrium.
Lemma 1 There exists no equilibrium where all sender types refrain from advice.
The reason for the result is that if the sender always refrains from advice, then for any
possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs at least some sender types would have a strict incentive
to deviate to an out-of-equilibrium message.
Based on this, one can show the following result.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium, there exists at least one message leading to investment.
The intuition is that if at least one message is sent in equilibrium (which always holds
by the previous lemma), then at least one of them must induce beliefs (i.e. the probability
of the good state conditional on the message) not lower than 0:5  otherwise, there is a
18The receiver can also form beliefs about the senders type  and his information state is conditional
on m. At the same time, specifying these beliefs in addition to (as) is redundant since the latter belief
is already su¢ cient to determine the equilibrium strategies of both players.
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contradiction to the prior of 0:5. Then, the receiver should invest after this message by
Assumption 1.
Next, those types who indeed observe the good state always induce investment.
Lemma 3 If is = G0, then all sender types send a message leading to investment.
Indeed, if the sender observes the good state, his anticipated cost from inducing
investment is zero, since he knows that the investment will turn out successful. Hence, his
expected utility from any message leading to investment is F , which is strictly larger than
the zero utility from sending a message leading to abstaining or refraining from advice.
Finally, in any equilibrium, there is a possibility for the sender to send an investment-
inducing message by Lemma 2.
In contrast to this case, whenever the sender does not observe the good state with
certainty (i.e. is 6= G0), the probability assigned by him to the bad state, and hence
the expected cost from inducing investment, is strictly positive. One can show that the
strategy of such types has a cuto¤ structure in any equilibrium.
Lemma 4 For each is 2 fB0; N 0g there exists a cuto¤ bis 2 (0; ] such that all types with
 < bis send a message leading to investment and all types with  > bis (if any) send a
message leading to abstaining or refrain from advice.
The intuition behind this result is the following. First, there are always types in
any information state who are su¢ ciently insensitive to guilt (under guilt aversion) or
receivers loss (under outcome-based preferences) to prefer inducing investment for any
receivers beliefs (which they can do by Lemma 2). Second, if some type prefers to induce
investment over getting zero, then all less sensitive types would also prefer at least the
same message over zero, hence, also inducing investment. Analogously, once some type
prefers the utility of zero over any possible investment-inducing message, all higher types
would also prefer zero, and hence would either induce abstaining or refrain from advice.
This corroborates the cuto¤ structure described in Lemma 4.19
Note that Lemma 4 allows that the receiver may invest in equilibrium not only if the
matched sender type  is below the cuto¤, but also if  is above the cuto¤ while the
sender refrains from advice (since the receivers belief conditional on refrainment may be
su¢ ciently high in equilibrium).
Finally, in any equilibrium the receivers beliefs are determined by the senders strategy
through Bayesrule that results in the following expression.
Lemma 5 The receivers equilibrium belief conditional on the senders action as is
(as)  Pr[Gjas] = Pr[a
sjG0]+ Pr[asjN 0](1  )
(Pr[asjG0] + Pr[asjB0])+ 2Pr[asjN 0](1  ) : (9)
19The strategy of the cuto¤ type  = bis is not specied by Lemma 4 since this type can be indi¤erent
over inducing investment or getting 0, and hence his equilibrium strategy can be both. However, as this
type has zero measure, his equilibrium strategy does not matter for the subsequent results.
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Note that Pr[asjis] is determined by the senders strategy in information state is, i.e.
by the fraction of types who choose action as conditional on this information state, while
 denotes the prior probability that the sender is informed.
3.2 Outcome-based preferences
Let us consider the equilibrium characterization in the benchmark case of purely outcome-
based preferences of the sender. We dene a pooling equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 A pooling equilibrium is dened as an equilibrium in which
 Some message m is sent if  2 (0; ] in state G0,  2 (0;bPB0 ] in state B0, and
 2 (0;bPN 0 ] in state N 0;
 All other types in states B0 and N 0 (if any) refrain from advice;
 The receiver invests after m, and invests after refrainment if and only if (?) > ;
 The beliefs after m and ? are determined by Bayesrule if possible. For any out-
of-equilibrium message bm it holds that (bm) = ( m) while the receiver invests after
it.20
The main feature of this equilibrium is that all types who prefer to induce investment
send the same message m. Thus, there is a complete pooling of investment-inducing types
in states B0 and N 0 with types in state G0.
Let us call a pooling equilibrium essentially unique if all other existing pooling
equilibria are the same except for the exogenous value of message m. Then, the following
holds.
Proposition 1 Under outcome-based preferences, there exists an essentially unique
pooling equilibrium.
The intuition for this equilibrium is the following. The senders preferences specied
by (3) imply that in any equilibrium all types with   bB0 = F= (  bN 0 = 2F=) prefer
to induce investment in state B0 (N 0), while the remaining types prefer to get 0 (e.g., by
refraining from advice). In turn, the receiver always prefers to invest after obtaining m,
i.e. ( m) >  (see (2)). This holds due to the fact that all types in state G0 pool on m,
which ensures ( m)  0:5 (while  < 0:5 by Assumption 1).
Figure 2 shows the basic structure of the pooling equilibrium. Here, each horizontal
line represents the set of sender types for a given information state. The black bracket
indicates types who send message m, while the white bracket indicates types who refrain
from advice. The gure shows three possible subtypes of this equilibrium depending on
20Note that the denition does not restrict (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs conditional on refrainment if
the latter is not on the equilibrium path.
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Figure 2: Pooling equilibrium.
whether bN 0 and bB0 are equal to , which is in turn determined by the value of F (i.e.
the magnitude of the monetary conict of interest in the bad state of the world).
The pooling equilibrium can be considered as a baseline under outcome-based
preferences since one can show that all other existing equilibria are payo¤-equivalent.
Moreover, there exists no responsive equilibrium where types in states B0 and N 0 induce
investment while separating from types in state G0.
Proposition 2 Under outcome-based preferences:
(i) All equilibria are payo¤-equivalent to the pooling equilibrium.
(ii) There exists no responsive equilibrium where a sender type induces investment in
state is 2 fB0; N 0g with a message not sent by types in state G0.
Part (i) follows from the fact that in all existing equilibria the cuto¤s bB0 and bN 0 are
the same (equal to F= and 2F=, respectively), as noted above. In turn, since under
outcome-based preferences the senders expected utility is fully determined by his type,
information state and whether he sends an investment-inducing message or not (which is
in turn determined by whether he is below or above the cuto¤), the claim follows.
The intuition for part (ii) of the proposition is that a separation of types in states
B0 and N 0 from types in state G0 would imply that the former types induce beliefs
lower than 0:5 with their message. In turn, at least some types in state G0 must induce
beliefs strictly above 0:5 in any responsive equilibrium (since all of these types send an
investment-inducing message by Lemma 3, and hence their relative share among all types
inducing investment is the highest). Then, the separating types in states B0 and N 0
would have a strict incentive to deviate to a more persuasive message sent by the types
in state G0. Indeed, under outcome-based preferences, such message would also induce
investment (and hence yield the same expected utility), while at the same time lead to
higher receivers beliefs (and hence will be strictly preferable in terms of lexicographic
preferences by Assumption 2).
3.3 Guilt aversion
The next sections show which equilibria arise if the sender has guilt-averse preferences.
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3.3.1 Equilibrium strategies
As noted in Section 2.2.1, the receiver invests after a given senders action as 2 fM;?g
if and only if (as) > . In turn, the sender chooses his action to maximize his expected






F   is(EsEr[U r(I)jas]  c)
= F   is(as)(P   c)
if (as)   or as = ?;
if (as) >  and as 2M;
(10)
where the last equality follows from the consistency of the senders second-order beliefs
in equilibrium (i.e. EsEr[U r(I)jas] = Er[U r(I)jas] = (as)(P   c) + c). Thus, in case
of sending a message, the sender faces a tradeo¤ between inducing investment by being
su¢ ciently persuasive (to ensure (m) > ), and at the same time keeping the receivers
expectations low to mitigate guilt (since (m) enters negatively in the senders utility
function once the receiver invests).
3.3.2 Pooling equilibrium
As in the case of outcome-based preferences, one can show that there always exists an
essentially unique pooling equilibrium also under guilt aversion.
Proposition 3 There exists an essentially unique pooling equilibrium.
The basic mechanism behind this equilibrium is as follows: In Subtype 1 of the
equilibrium (see Figure 2), the senders monetary incentive F (i.e. the degree of his
conict of interest) is high enough such that all sender types in all states want to pool
on the message m, which induces investment. If the value of the monetary incentive
decreases (Subtypes 2 and 3), then the most guilt-sensitive types in states N 0 and B0
prefer to refrain from advice to avoid guilt. Clearly, the fraction of such types is larger in
state B0, where the expected guilt is higher than in state N 0 for a given guilt sensitivity.
Besides, no type has a strict incentive to deviate to out-of-equilibrium messages, which
lead to to the same receivers beliefs as m does.
The equilibrium beliefs conditional on m are determined by the cuto¤s bPB0 and bPN 0
(in particular, by substituting (Pr[ mjG0] = 1, Pr[ mjN 0] = bPN 0= and Pr[ mjB0] = bPB0=
into (9)). One can show that lower cuto¤s correspond to a higher persuasiveness of the
message m (i.e. a higher probability of the good state of the world conditional on the
message). As Proposition 3 implies, the cuto¤ types which lead to the persuasiveness of
m making these types indi¤erent between m and ? (i.e. ensuring the equilibrium), are
always unique for given parameter values. Finally, the receiver always nds it optimal to
invest following m by the same argument as in the case of outcome-based preferences.
Note that in the pooling equilibrium there are two types of loss to the receiver from
the ex ante perspective. The rst one results from getting message m in state B0 (which
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is driven by the monetary bias in sender incentives, termed as bias-driven damage).21
The second type of loss is caused by the sender refraining from advice in state N 0 if the
receiver abstains after this (or guilt-driven damage). In this case, since investment is ex
ante protable by Assumption 1, the receiver would strictly prefer to invest instead had she
known that the sender is actually uninformed. Such a situation can be interpreted as an
ine¢ cient reluctance of the sender to recommend products that are risky though protable
from an ex ante perspective. In terms of the medical example, a doctor who is too afraid
of appearing incompetent (or being prosecuted for bad treatment) might prescribe to
his patient only the most conservative traditional treatments with predictable but low
e¢ ciency, instead on providing advice on more innovative (and hence, more risky), but
more promising treatment methods. Analogously, a nancial advisor might be reluctant
to recommend reasonably risky but protable nancial products.
Finally, note that under a certain range of parameters there also exists a payo¤-
equivalent equilibrium where the sender types above the cuto¤ pool on a message which
leads to the receivers abstaining (and hence to a utility of 0 for the sender) instead of
refraining from advice. This equilibrium exists whenever the receivers beliefs induced
by such message do not trigger investment (as otherwise the corresponding sender types
would rather prefer to avoid guilt by refraining from advice).
3.3.3 Separating equilibrium
Note that generally types in stateG0 have di¤erent preferences over receiver beliefs relative
to types in the other states: while the former prefer to send a more persuasive message
by lexicographic preferences (while their expected guilt is always zero), sender types in
states B0 and N 0 always strictly prefer a less persuasive message. As shown below, such
asymmetry gives rise to the possibility of separation between types in state G0 on the one
side, and types in states B0 and N 0 on the other.
In particular, we dene the separating equilibrium where, besides the most persuasive
message m as in the pooling equilibrium, an additional "evasive" message em is used.
Denition 2 Separating equilibrium is dened as an equilibrium in which
 Some message m is sent by all types in state G0;
 Some other message em is sent if  2 (0;bSB0 ] in state B0, and  2 (0;bSN 0 ] in state
N 0;
 All other types in states B0 and N 0 (if any) refrain from advice;
 The receiver invests after m and em, and invests after refrainment if and only if
(?) > ;
21See Sobel (2018) for the introduction of the notion of damage in communication games. Our
denition is slightly di¤erent since the receivers loss is calculated from the senders ex ante perspective
rather than from the ex post perspective.
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Figure 3: Separating equilibrium.
 The beliefs after m, em and ? are determined by Bayes rule if possible. For any
out-of-equilibrium message bm it holds that (bm) 2 [(em); ( m)], while the receiver
invests after it.22
Let us call a separating equilibrium essentially unique if all other existing separating
equilibria are the same except for the exogenous value of messages m and em. Then, the
following holds.



















Otherwise, there exists no separating equilibrium.
The scheme of this equilibrium is given in Figure 3. Besides types sending the highest
message m (black gure bracket) and types refraining from advice (white gure bracket)
as in the pooling equilibrium, there is a set of types sending the message em (gray gure
bracket).
The intuition for this equilibrium is the following. Sender types in state G0, facing no
guilt, have the same utility from both m and em, which is equal to F since the receiver
invests after both messages. At the same time, since m leads to higher receivers beliefs,
they strictly prefer it over em in terms of lexicographic preferences. The types in states N 0
and B0 who induce investment face a strictly positive expected guilt, and hence strictly
prefer the evasive message em, since (em) < ( m) (while the monetary payo¤ is the same).
Thus, the evasive message provides a way to mitigate guilt by inducing less optimistic
payo¤ expectations on the part of the receiver, while still keeping her investing after
22As in the case of the pooling equilibrium, (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs conditional on refrainment are
not restricted if the latter is not on the equilibrium path.
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receiving advice. Besides, no type has an incentive to deviate to any out-of-equilibrium
message bm as far as the corresponding beliefs are in the specied range.23
The receivers incentive constraints are ( m) >  (investment after m) and (em) > 
(investment after em). The rst constraint is trivially satised. The second constraint
(meaning that the evasive message is su¢ ciently credible) is satised whenever the share





In addition, in Subtype 2 of the equilibrium, the only interior cuto¤ bSB0 should be
su¢ ciently distant from the boundary  (so that there is no excessive pooling of types in
stateB0 pretending to be uninformed), which places additional restriction on the monetary
bias F (see the second case in Proposition 4).
Note that the types in state N 0 who send message em still experience guilt even though
they do not inate receivers expectations above their own belief about the state of the
world. This can be seen as empirically plausible by the following reasons. First, we
abstract away from the exogenous meaning of messages so that em does not necessarily
mean "truth-telling" in its literal sense for the types in stateN 0. Second, the receiver, after
getting message em, can never be sure whether the sender is indeed uninformed, or just
pretended to be so while in fact knowing in advance that the investment is unprotable.
Hence, she may still be frustrated with the senders advice if the investment turns out
unsuccessful, which could ultimately cause the corresponding intrinsic or extrinsic costs
for the latter.
Regarding ine¢ ciencies arising for the receiver in equilibrium, the separating
equilibrium can also feature bias-driven damage (in Subtypes 2 and 3) and guilt-driven
damage (in Subtype 3), as in the pooling equilibrium. At the same time, one can show that
the cuto¤s in the separating equilibrium are higher than in the pooling equilibrium, which
generally leads to weakly higher bias-driven damage yet weakly lower guilt-driven damage
(see Section 3.3.5 below for the analysis of the corresponding welfare implications).
Lemma 6 Whenever the separating equilibrium exists, for any is 2 fB0; N 0g it holds thatbSis  bPis with a strict inequality if and only if bPis < .
The reason for this is that the evasive message em is strictly less persuasive than the
message m in the pooling equilibrium, so that a larger fraction of sender types in a given
state prefer to induce investment with this message.
3.3.4 Other equilibria
The following proposition justies the focus of the current analysis on the two types of
equilibria considered above.
23As in the case of the pooling equilibrium, one can get a payo¤-equivalent equilibrium (under a
stricter parameter range) where the sender types above the cuto¤ send a message leading to abstaining
instead of refraining from advice.
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Proposition 5 Any existing equilibrium is payo¤-equivalent to either the pooling or the
separating equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is that there can be at most two levels of persuasiveness
of investment-inducing messages in equilibrium: one for messages sent by types in state
G0, and one for messages sent by types in states B0 and N 0. Any heterogeneity within
these two groups of messages would imply a strict incentive to deviate for the sender: the
types in state G0 would always like to deviate to the most persuasive message (according
to the lexicographic preferences, see Assumption 2), while the types in the other states
would always strictly prefer a less persuasive message (which then yields a lower expected
guilt). Hence, either all types inducing investment send messages with the same level
of persuasiveness in all states, or the types in state G0 separate (inducing (m) = 1).
In turn, one can show that these two cases would yield the same level of equilibrium
persuasiveness of investment-inducing messages as in the pooling and the separating
equilibrium, respectively. Finally, the equilibrium level of persuasiveness uniquely pins
down the indi¤erent cuto¤ types bB0 and bN 0, which nally leads to payo¤ equivalence
of any existing equilibrium to either the pooling or the separating equilibrium for both
players.
Hence, the remaining equilibria are essentially equivalent to either the pooling or
the separating equilibrium in the sense of being characterized by the same receivers
beliefs emerging in equilibrium (as far as the corresponding message induces investment).
Technically, the only di¤erence of these equilibria from the baseline equilibria considered
above is that the former just allow for a larger quantity of di¤erently formulated
(investment-inducing) messages on the equilibrium path, which, however, have the same
"meaning", i.e. the same receivers beliefs conditional on the message, as in either the
pooling or the separating equilibrium.
3.3.5 Welfare comparison
As shown in Section 3.3.3, guilt aversion on the side of the sender allows for the separating
equilibrium, in which the sender types who prefer to conceal their information from the
receiver pool with uninformed rather than di¤erently informed types, and which does
not arise under purely outcome-based preferences. This section considers whether this
structure of equilibrium communication is eventually detrimental or benecial to the
receiver and the sender relative to the pooling equilibrium.
Receivers utility. Consider the receivers utility from the ex ante perspective, i.e.
before she observes the senders message. One can show that the receivers ex ante
expected utility in the separating equilibrium can be either higher or lower than in the
pooling equilibrium, depending on the monetary conict of interest.





so that there exists nonempty interval 
such that both the pooling and the separating equilibria exist if and only if F 2 . Then,
there exists F  2  such that for any F  F  (F < F ) where both the pooling and the
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separating equilibria exist, the pooling equilibrium yields a higher (lower) ex ante utility
for the receiver than the separating equilibrium, and strictly so for some F .
The result is based on the fact that the cuto¤s in the separating equilibrium are higher
(see Lemma 6), since message em in the separating equilibrium is less persuasive, and hence
less costly in terms of guilt than message m in the pooling equilibrium. This relation of
the cuto¤s implies that the rate of bias-driven damage (sending an investment-inducing
message in state B0) is higher in the separating equilibrium. On the other hand, a lower
cuto¤ in state N 0 in the pooling equilibrium implies that the rate of guilt-driven damage
(refraining from advice in state N 0, see Figure 2) is higher there. Recall that this is
also detrimental to the receivers utility since she prefers investment over abstaining ex
ante (by Assumption 1). Thus, the senders option to use the evasive message in the
separating equilibrium has two e¤ects on the receivers utility. The negative e¤ect stems
from providing psychologically cheap opportunities for the sender to induce investment
after observing the bad state by credibly pretending to be uninformed. The positive e¤ect
stems from raising the e¢ ciency of communication of uninformed types, whose expected
guilt in case of inducing investment is reduced. The total e¤ect depends on which of these
two e¤ects dominates.
In particular, if F is su¢ ciently large, then both pooling and separating equilibria are
of either Subtype 1 or Subtype 2, where there is no guilt-driven damage (see Figures 2 and
3). Consequently, the total e¤ect of a switch from the pooling to the separating equilibrium
is limited to enhancing bias-driven damage in state B0, which leads to a welfare loss for
the receiver (except for the case when both equilibria are of Subtype 1 when the receivers
ex ante expected utility does not change). If, to the contrary, F is su¢ ciently small, both
the pooling and the separating equilibrium are of Subtype 3. Then, besides the negative
e¤ect, there is an additional positive e¤ect of equilibrium separation (from types in state
N 0) due to a reduction in guilt-driven damage. A clear-cut result here is that the positive
e¤ect in this case is always larger than the negative e¤ect related to bias-driven damage.24
Finally, if F is in the intermediate range where the pooling equilibrium is of Subtype 3 and
the separating equilibrium is not, then the comparison between the equilibria depends on
how large the e¤ect of guilt-driven damage in the pooling equilibrium is. In particular,
there is a unique threshold F  such that for F < F  the scope of guilt-driven damage in
the pooling equilibrium is large enough to cause an overall lower ex ante utility for the
receiver than in the separating equilibrium.
Senders utility. From the perspective of the sender, the separating equilibrium is
24The reason for this is as follows. First, note that a switch from the separating to the pooling
equilibrium leads to an overall reduction of investment in states N 0 and B0 (due to the decrease in the
cuto¤s). At the same time, the expected receivers payo¤ conditional on obtaining an investment-inducing
message in these information states remains the same in both equilibria. This is ensured by the fact that
the ratio of the cuto¤s in states N 0 and B0 is the same (see Lemmas A.6 and A.9 in the online Appendix).
Finally, this conditional expected payo¤ is positive, because the receiver invests after em in the separating
equilibrium. Hence, the switch from the separating to the pooling equilibrium in this case e¤ectively
results (merely) in contraction of ex ante e¢ cient investment, yielding a loss in terms of the ex-ante
utility of the receiver.
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always the preferable equilibrium.
Proposition 7 Whenever the separating equilibrium exists, it yields a weakly higher
expected utility than the pooling equilibrium for any sender type in any information state,
and strictly so at least for some types in states B0 and N 0.
Intuitively, any sender types inducing investment in states B0 and N 0 would benet
from the evasive message em in the separating equilibrium being less persuasive (and hence
implying a lower expected guilt) than message m in the pooling equilibrium. Moreover,
since the cuto¤s in the separating equilibrium bSis are higher, the types between bPis and bSis
would benet from switching from refrainment in the pooling equilibrium (which yields a
utility of zero) to sending an investment-inducing message in the separating equilibrium
(which yields a positive utility). Finally, the types in state G0 (always obtaining F ) and
the types refraining from advice in both equilibria will be indi¤erent between them.
4 Welfare e¤ects of ex ante information quality
This section analyzes implications of guilt aversion for the playerspreferences regarding
the senders ex ante information quality  (i.e. the ex ante likelihood of him being informed
about the state of the world). In particular, we consider whether the receiver is better
o¤ when dealing with an ex ante more informed sender, and whether the sender himself
ex ante prefers to be better informed. Strikingly, this is not always the case in both
instances.
4.1 Receivers preference over ex ante information quality
Common intuition suggests that once the receiver is rational, and thus cannot be made
worse o¤ by communicating with the sender, she should benet from the sender being
more informed. However, as shown below, guilt aversion may cause a negative externality
from the sender being more informed for the receivers welfare under certain conditions.
The reason is that for an ex ante less informed (and guilt-averse) sender it is sometimes
easier to commit to providing truthful advice.
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics of the receivers ex ante
expected utility with respect to  in the pooling and the separating equilibrium (recall
that all other existing equilibria are payo¤-equivalent to either of them by Proposition 5).






such that the receivers ex ante utility strictly decreases in  on some interval K if and
only if for any  2 K it holds:
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(ii) In the separating equilibrium, the receivers ex ante utility strictly decreases in 








































Consider the pooling equilibrium. There, an increase in  has two e¤ects: a direct
positive and an indirect negative. The positive e¤ect relates to the fact that once the
sender is informed (i.e. is either in state G0 or B0), the receiver is (weakly) more likely to
invest in the good than in the bad state of the world. The reason for this is that the share
of types inducing investment in state B0 is (weakly) lower than such share in state G0. On
the other hand, if the sender is uninformed, then the receiver is equally likely to invest in
both states of the world. Moreover, there can be foregone investment in the good state
of the world (due to guilt-driven damage), which never happens with an informed sender.
Altogether, this implies that
E[U rjG0 _B0]  E[U rjN 0]; (12)
so that an increase in  and, hence, the probability of facing an informed sender has a
positive e¤ect on the receivers welfare (all else equal).
However, an increase in  has also an indirect negative e¤ect on the receivers welfare
through guilt aversion. In particular, higher  implies that the message m is more likely
to be sent by informed types, which by (12) should lead to higher receivers expectations
conditional on the message (all else equal). This results in higher expected guilt of the
sender from sending m, pushing the cuto¤s down. In turn, this can cause an increase
in guilt-driven damage, which under some parameter values can overweigh the positive
e¤ect described in the preceding paragraph.
In the separating equilibrium, an increase in  again has two e¤ects. The rst (positive)
e¤ect is the same as in the previous case: all else equal (i.e. for given cuto¤ values), the
receiver prefers to deal with an informed rather than an uninformed sender. The second
(negative) e¤ect is driven by guilt aversion: higher  decreases the persuasiveness of the
evasive message em. In particular, higher  implies that the share of truly uninformed
types is lower, so that the evasive message em becomes less credible and rather signals
types in state B0 who want to conceal their bad news. By being less persuasive, the
message em induces less guilt on the part of the sender so that the equilibrium cuto¤s
increase. If the equilibrium is of Subtype 2, this leads to a decrease in the receivers
welfare due to the spread of bias-driven damage. Under certain parameter values this can
render the total e¤ect of higher  to be negative.
Thus, the ex ante likelihood of obtaining an informative signal a¤ects the senders
anticipation of guilt, and hence the rate of truth-telling conditional on a given information
state. This mechanism leads to seemingly paradoxical cases when even a completely
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rational receiver prefers to deal with a sender who is less likely to have the information
she needs.25
4.2 Senders preference over ex ante information quality
Consider the preference of a given sender type over his likelihood of being informed from
the ex ante perspective, i.e. before his information state is realized.26
The e¤ect of  for the senders ex ante expected utility is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9 (i) In the pooling equilibrium:
 if F  0:5(P   c), then the sender is indi¤erent over his probability of being
informed.
 if F < 0:5(P c), then the sender strictly prefers ex ante a lower (higher) probability
of being informed if his type is su¢ ciently low (high).
(ii) In the separating equilibrium, the sender always strictly prefers ex ante a higher
probability of being informed.
First, consider the pooling equilibrium. If F  0:5(P   c), then the equilibrium is of
Subtype 1 (see Figure 2), where all sender types induce investment while the receivers
beliefs conditional on m are always equal to her prior of 0:5. In this case, clearly, the
senders ex ante expected utility does not change with .
If F < 0:5(P   c), then the cuto¤bPB0 is smaller than , so that at least some types in
state B0 should refrain from advice and, hence, condition their decision on the obtained
information. Then, for a given level of expected guilt, such types would be strictly better
o¤ when knowing the state of the world rather than staying uninformed, in which case
they are not able to adjust their behavior to the state. For instance, if some type refrains
from advice while being uninformed (and hence gets a utility of 0), he would still induce
investment and gain F with probability 0:5 (i.e. in state G0) in case if he knows the state.
At the same time, as considered in Section 4.1, the level of  also a¤ects the receivers
equilibrium beliefs in that higher  leads to higher beliefs conditional on m. This
is detrimental to the senders utility by causing higher expected guilt. Whether this
negative e¤ects overweighs the positive e¤ect described above depends on the senders
guilt sensitivity. Su¢ ciently low sender types (in particular, below the cuto¤ bPB0) always
induce investment in equilibrium, i.e. do not condition their strategy on the obtained
25A positive e¤ect of noise in the senders information (through a di¤erent mechanism than
considered here) is also found by Blume et al. (2007) within the benchmark cheap-talk framework of
Crawford and Sobel (1982).
26Note that a change in  after the senders information state is realized cannot a¤ect the senders
state of knowledge anymore (and, correspondingly, the receivers beliefs about it), and thus would not
have any e¤ect on the playerswelfare.
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information, and hence do not benet from the positive e¤ect of being (objectively)
better informed. At the same time, they still su¤er from higher guilt stemming from
the amended receivers beliefs conditional on m as a result of higher . Thus, for these
types the overall e¤ect of  is negative, i.e. they would prefer to commit ex ante to a
lower likelihood of being informed. Note that under the range of F and  specied in
Proposition 8(i), both the receiver and the lowest sender types would prefer that the ex
ante information quality is lower (in the pooling equilibrium).
In contrast, su¢ ciently high types vary their behavior in equilibrium depending on
information state is (unless the equilibrium is of Subtype 1). Hence, their benet from
knowing the state of the world is the largest (given also that their utility in state N 0 tends
to be low, or even zero). One can show that for these types this benet overweighs the
loss from higher expected guilt conditional on m due to higher . Thus, these types would
prefer to commit ex ante to the highest possible likelihood of being informed.
Next, consider the separating equilibrium. In the same way as before, the sender
benets from knowing the state of the world and, hence, being able to condition his
behavior on this state. Besides, a higher ex ante likelihood that the sender is informed
implies that the evasive message em is less persuasive (since it is then more likely to be
sent by types in state B0), in which case the sender has lower expected guilt. Thus, an
increase in  has always a positive e¤ect on the senders ex ante utility in the separating
equilibrium.
4.3 Comparison to the outcome-based model
Notably, the result that the receivers or the senders welfare can decline with the ex ante
quality of the senders information  cannot be explained by outcome-based preferences.
Proposition 10 Under outcome-based preferences, the ex ante utility of both the receiver
and the sender never decreases with .
Intuitively, under outcome-based preferences an increase in  does not a¤ect the
senders utility from inducing investment in a given information state, and hence the
equilibrium cuto¤s. The only e¤ect of  which matters for both players is the resulting
change in the distribution of the senders information states, i.e. the decrease in the
relative probability of state N 0. As shown in Section 4.1, the receiver then benets from
ex ante more e¢ cient advice, since she is relatively more likely to invest in the good state
than in the bad state conditional on the sender being informed. At the same time, as
discussed in Section 4.2, each sender type also prefers to be informed (all else equal),
since he is then able to adjust his decision to the realized state of the world. Thus, under
outcome-based preferences higher  is benecial to both players.
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5 Discussion
This paper studies a model of strategic communication where the sender is guilt-averse
toward the receiver. The main result is that guilt aversion may cause a specic structure
of equilibrium communication where the sender types observing the bad state of the
world induce investment by pooling with uninformed types, while separating from those
types who observe the good state. The emergence of such evasive communication is
based on the senders incentives to reduce the receivers ex ante payo¤ expectations as
much as possible, while still keeping her choosing the most preferred senders action
(investment). Mimicking uninformed types naturally ts these senders incentives by
being less persuasive than pooling with types observing the good state, yet su¢ ciently
persuasive to induce investment. Notably, such equilibrium is impossible under purely
outcome-based preferences if the likelihood of the receivers investment is even slightly
sensitive to her beliefs conditional on the message (which implies at least lexicographic
preferences of the sender for higher beliefs of the receiver).
Thus, the model predicts evasive language as a characteristic feature of strategic
communication once the sender has guilt-averse preferences.27 Moreover, it explains
under which conditions this feature is detrimental to the receiver (while the sender always
benets from the possibility to send evasive messages in equilibrium). The negative e¤ect
of evasion for the receiver stems from providing the sender with a psychologically cheap
way to avoid communicating bad news. The positive e¤ect of evasion is driven by the fact
that truly uninformed sender types are more prone to induce (ex ante e¢ cient) investment
in the separating equilibrium, using the evasive message, than in the pooling equilibrium.
Which e¤ect dominates depends on the degree of the monetary conict of interest, with a
high conict of interest resulting in an overall negative e¤ect of the option to send evasive
messages in equilibrium.
Another important consequence of guilt aversion is that higher ex ante quality of
the senders information may backre for both the receiver and the sender under certain
conditions. In particular, the receiver may prefer to deal with an ex ante less informed
sender, while the sender himself would sometimes prefer to ex ante commit to a lower
quality of his information. The underlying reason for these e¤ects is that the ex ante
likelihood of the sender being informed ultimately a¤ects the receivers beliefs conditional
on the equilibrium messages, which in turn changes the level of expected guilt (which
is relevant for the sender) and, hence, the senders incentives to induce investment in
di¤erent information states (which is relevant for the receiver). Again, such preferences
over information cannot be explained by the outcome-based model. Altogether, this
suggests that guilt aversion may create adverse incentives with respect to information
27Evasive and vague communication is widespread in many social contexts. Examples include academic
communication (Metsä-Ketelä 2012), doctor-patient interactions (Adolphs et al. 2007), or corporate
annual reports (Guo et al. 2017). See also Serra-Garcia et al. (2011) and Khalmetski et al. (2017) for
experimental evidence that senders indeed tend to use evasive and vague messages as a substitute for
explicit lying.
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transparency in the economy, which opens up a promising direction for future research.28
Overall, the results may be applicable to predict patterns of (evasive) communication
and the corresponding welfare implications in a range of real-life advice settings where
advisors may be driven by guilt aversion toward their customers (e.g., in medical or
nancial advice). In terms of policy implications, our results suggest that in some
situations a policy maker who aims to protect advisees from fraudulent advice may want to
restrict advisorscommunication to explicit statements (to reduce the scope of evasion and
induce a pooling equilibrium structure). At the same time, conventional policies involving
punishment of explicit lying (in case it is veriable ex post) may lead to the emergence of
more opaque equilibrium communication (i.e. a separating equilibrium structure), which
can eventually backre for the recipients of advice. Further research may clarify how
policy interventions in the sphere of expert advice could be adjusted to possible e¤ects of
guilt aversion and, more generally, belief-dependent preferences.
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A.1 General equilibrium properties
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium where
all sender types refrain from advice, and hence get utility of 0. If there exists at least one
out-of-equilibrium message inducing receivers beliefs higher than  (and hence leading to
investment), then at least all types in state G0, who have no expected guilt, would deviate
to this message obtaining F > 0. In the other case, if all out-of-equilibrium messages
induce abstaining, then all sender types would strictly prefer any of such messages over
refrainment by Assumption 3.
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1 in any equilibrium there should exist at least one
message sent with a positive probability. Assume by contradiction that all messages used
on the equilibrium path induce conditional beliefs (weakly) lower than  (so that the
receiver abstains after all of them), i.e.
8m 2 E;Pr[Gjm]  , (A.1)
where E is the union set of all messages sent with a positive probability in equilibrium.
Denote the event that the sender is sending a message m 2 E by fE. Note that since
there exists at least one message leading to the receivers abstaining, no sender type would
refrain from advice by Assumption 3 so that
Pr[fEjG] = Pr[fE] = 1:
Consequently, by Bayesrule,
Pr[GjfE] = Pr[fEjG] Pr[G]
Pr[fE] = Pr[G] = 0:5, (A.2)








 Pr[m] = 
X
m2E
Pr[m] =  =
 c
P   c < 0:5; (A.3)
where the rst inequality is by (A.1) and the second inequality is by Assumption 1. Since
(A.3) contradicts (A.2), the claim follows.
Lemma A.1 A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is that the
persuasiveness of any investment-inducing message used in states is 2 fB0; N 0g is the
same.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist two investment-inducing messages
m1 and m2 sent in at least some of the information states is 2 fB0; N 0g such that
(m1) > (m2).
Consider rst outcome-based preferences. Since under these preferences the expected
utility of the sender is fully determined by his type and the receivers response, all types
inducing investment have the same expected utility conditional on both m1 and m2.
Consequently, any type  who sends m2 in equilibrium (and hence has a positive expected
utility if the receiver invests) would like to deviate to m1 by lexicographic preferences
(Assumption 2). Thus, m2 cannot be an equilibrium message.
Next, consider the case of guilt aversion. If is 6= G0 (so that is > 0) we have
U sis(; (m1); I) = F is(m1)(P c) < F is(m2)(P c) = U sis(; (m2); I): (A.4)
Then, any type  would strictly prefer m2 over m1 in any information state is 2 fB0; N 0g.
Thus, m1 cannot be an equilibrium message.
Proof of Lemma 3. Assume by contradiction that some sender type  in state G0
does not send a message leading to investment so that his expected utility is 0 under both
preferences. At the same time, by Lemma 2 there exists at least one message m0 leading
to investment. By ( 3) and (10), the expected utility from sending this message in state
G0 is equal to F > 0 under both preferences. Consequently, the sender would have a strict
incentive to deviate to m0, which yields a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider the case of guilt aversion. By Lemma 2 there
exists at least one message leading to investment in equilibrium. Next, by Lemma A.1
all messages leading to investment sent by types in states B0 and N 0 have the same
persuasiveness, which we denote by 0. Consider further the following possible cases for
given is 2 fB0; N 0g.
Case 1: U sis(; Ij0) > 0. Then, since U sis(; Ij0) is continuously decreasing in  for
given 0 (see (10)), it follows that for all  <  it holds
U sis(; Ij0) > 0; (A.5)
that is all sender types in state is should strictly prefer to send a message leading to
investment (which must exist in equilibrium by Lemma 2) over 0 (which would result
from sending a message which induces abstaining or from refraining from advice).
Case 2: U sis(; Ij0)  0. In this case, since at the same time U sis(0; Ij0) = F > 0, by
the intermediate value theorem there must exist type bis 2 (0; ] such that
U sis(
bis ; Ij0) = 0. (A.6)
Then, for all  < bis it holds U sis(; Ij0) > 0. These types strictly prefer to send a message
leading to investment over alternative actions. At the same time, for all  > bis (if such
types exist, i.e. if bis < ) it holds U sis(; Ij0) < 0, so that these types strictly prefer to
30
send a message leading to abstaining or to refrain from advice over sending a message
leading to investment.
Hence, in all possible cases, if there exists an equilibrium, then it must have the cuto¤
structure described in the lemma.
The proof for the case of outcome-based preferences follows the same arguments.
Proof of Lemma 5. We have




(Pr[asjG0 \G] Pr[G0jG] + Pr[asjN 0 \G] Pr[N 0jG])0:5
Pr[asjG0] Pr[G0] + Pr[asjN 0] Pr[N 0] + Pr[asjB0] Pr[B0]
=
(Pr[asjG0] Pr[G0jG] + Pr[asjN 0] Pr[N 0jG])0:5
Pr[asjG0] Pr[G0] + Pr[asjN 0] Pr[N 0] + Pr[asjB0] Pr[B0]
=
Pr[asjG0]+ Pr[asjN 0](1  )
(Pr[asjG0] + Pr[asjB0])+ 2Pr[asjN 0](1  ) ; (A.7)
where the second equality is by Bayes rule, the third equality is by the law of total
probability, and the fourth equality is by the fact that equilibrium messages of any sender
type  are fully determined by his information state, i.e. Pr[asjis \ G] = Pr[asjis] for
is 2 fN 0; G0g.
A.2 Outcome-based preferences
Proof of Proposition 1.
Claim 1. Under outcome-based preferences, the equilibrium cuto¤s are given by
bB0 = minf; F=g; (A.8)bN 0 = minf; 2F=g; (A.9)
Proof. Assume by contradiction that this is not the case. Note that by Lemma 4
in any equilibrium the sender induces investment in state is 2 fB0; N 0g if  < bis , and
obtains 0 if  > bis . Then, some sender types would have a strict incentive to deviate
since by (3) the sender prefers the receivers investment over 0 in state B0 ( N 0) if and
only if   F= (  2F=).
Claim 2. Under outcome-based preferences, there exists an essentially unique pooling
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a putative pooling equilibrium with the cuto¤s given by (A.8) and
(A.9), while the receivers belief conditional on any out-of-equilibrium message being set
at ( m). The utility function (3) implies that the sender prefers a message leading to
investment over 0 if and only if he observes the good state or   F= in state B0 or
  2F= in state N 0. Hence, no sender type has an incentive to deviate from sending
m to refrainment or the other way round given the receivers response. Besides, no
sender type has an incentive to deviate to any out-of-equilibrium message bm given that
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(bm) = ( m) by assumption.
Consider the receivers incentives to invest after m (the receivers incentive constraint
in case of the senders refrainment is satised by construction). By Lemma 5
Pr[Gj m] = Pr[ mjG
0]+ Pr[ mjN 0](1  )
(Pr[ mjG0] + Pr[ mjB0])+ 2Pr[ mjN 0](1  )
 Pr[ mjG
0]+ Pr[ mjN 0](1  )
2 Pr[ mjG0]+ 2Pr[ mjN 0](1  ) = 0:5 > ;
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that Pr[ mjB0]  Pr[ mjG0] by construction
of the equilibrium, and the last inequality is by Assumption 1. Hence, the receiver always
nds it optimal to invest after m (and hence after bm given that (bm) = ( m)).
Thus, all incentive constraints are satised so that the prescribed strategies and beliefs
constitute an equilibrium.
Finally, by Claim 1, all existing equilibria have the same cuto¤s. Hence, all existing
pooling equilibria can only be di¤erent in terms of exogenous formulation of the messages.
Consequently, the initially considered pooling equilibrium is essentially unique.
Lemma A.2 If in equilibrium the sender refrains from advice with a positive probability,
then the receiver invests after refrainment if and only if Pr[Gje>] > .
Proof. Claim 1. The sender types strictly above the cuto¤s bB0 and bN 0 either all refrain
from advice or all send message(s) leading to abstaining.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that some sender types above the cuto¤s send
message(s) leading to abstaining (which leads to the senders utility of 0 under both
preferences), and some refrain from advice (which also leads to 0). Then, the latter
types would have a strict incentive to deviate to any message leading to abstaining by
lexicographic preferences (Assumption 3).
Claim 2. If Pr[Gje>]   , then the receiver abstains in equilibrium in case if  > bis.
Proof. By Claim 1, the sender types above the cuto¤ either always send a message
leading to abstaining, or all refrain from advice. In the rst case, the claim follows
immediately. In the second case, the receivers belief conditional on refraining is
(?) = Pr[Gj?] = Pr[Gje>]  ,
where the inequality is by initial assumption. Consequently, the receiver abstains as well.
Claim 3. If Pr[Gje>] > , then the sender types strictly above the cuto¤s always
refrain from advice in equilibrium.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that Pr[Gje>] >  and there exists type  > bis who
sends a message leading to abstaining in equilibrium (messages leading to investment
cannot be sent by types  > bis in equilibrium by Lemma 4). Then, by Claim 1, all
sender types above the cuto¤ send a message leading to abstaining. Denote the set of all
messages sent by types above the cuto¤s in states B0 and N 0 by >. Denote the event
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that the senders message belongs to > as e>. Note that by Lemma 4 any message from
> is never sent by the types below the cuto¤, which implies
Pr[Gje>] = Pr[Gje>]:
Consequently, we have
Pr[Gje>] = Pr[Gje>] = X
m2>




Pr[Gjm] Pr[mje>]  X
m2>
 Pr[mje>] = ,
where the second equality is by the law of total probability and the fact that the overall
message set is countable by assumption, and the inequality is due to the fact that all
messages in > must induce abstaining. In turn, this contradicts the initial assumption
of Pr[Gje>] > .
Claim 4. If Pr[Gje>] > , then the receiver invests after ? if on the equilibrium
path.
Proof. If Pr[Gje>] > , then by Claim 3 the sender types above the cuto¤ must
all refrain in equilibrium (while the types below the cuto¤ never refrain by Lemma 4).
Consequently,
Pr[Gj?] = Pr[Gje>] > ;
where the inequality is by assumption. Hence, the receiver would always prefer to invest
conditional on the sender refraining from advice.
The claim of the lemma follows jointly from Claims 2 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Claim 1. All equilibria are payo¤-equivalent to an existing pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any existing equilibrium. Let us show that it is payo¤-equivalent to
a pooling equilibrium (existing by Proposition 1).
By Claim 1 in the previous proof the cuto¤s bPB0 and bPN 0 in any two equilibria are the
same. Hence, by Lemmas 4 and A.2, the receivers action conditional on a given senders
type in a given information state (except for the zero measured cuto¤ types) must be
the same between the equilibria. Consequently, the receivers expected payo¤ is also the
same.
Consider any given senders type  in an information state is. Note rst that the cuto¤sbPis for is 2 fB0; N 0g are the same between the equilibria by Claim 1 in the previous proof.
Then, we can have the following cases:
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  > bPis , then by Lemma 4 the sender obtains 0 in both
equilibria.
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  < bPis , then by Lemma 4 the sender obtains the same expected
payo¤ of F   Pr[Bjis]   in both equilibria.
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- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  = bPis < , then the sender must be indi¤erent between 0 and
sending an investment-inducing message, and thus expects 0 in either equilibrium.
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  = bPis = , then the sender is either again indi¤erent
between 0 and sending an investment-inducing message, or has a strictly positive utility
from inducing investment in both equilibria obtaining the same expected payo¤ of
F   Pr[Bjis]  .
- If is = G0, then by Lemma 3 the sender always obtains F in both equilibria.
Hence, any given senders type in any information state has the same expected utility
in both equilibria.
Claim 2. In any given equilibrium all messages inducing investment have the same
persuasiveness.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there are two distinct messagesm0 andm00 on the
equilibrium path which induce investment while (m0) > (m00). The utility of any given
type from sending these messages given by (3) is the same. Then, all types sending m00
in equilibrium (whose expected utility conditional on investment must be positive, since
otherwise they would deviate to refraining from advice) would strictly prefer to deviate
to m0 by the lexicographic preferences (Assumption 2).
Claim 3. There exists no responsive equilibrium where a sender type induces
investment in state is 2 fB0; N 0g with a message not sent by types in state G0 .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that this is the case. Note that all message inducing
investment must lead to the same persuasiveness 0 by Claim 2. Since some messages
induce investment while being sent only by types in states B0 and/or N 0 by assumption
(while Pr[GjB0] = 0 < Pr[GjN 0] = 0:5), we must have
0  0:5: (A.10)
Note also that since the equilibrium is assumed to be responsive (i.e. the ex ante likelihood
of investment is smaller than 1), then by Lemma 4 and the fact that bB0  bN 0 (see (A.8)
and (A.9)) we have bB0 < . (A.11)
Next, denote by I the set of all messages inducing investment in equilibrium. Denote
by fI the event that the senders message belongs to I . By the law of total probability
and the fact that the message space is assumed to be countable, we have
Pr[GjfI ] = X
m2I




Pr[Gjm] Pr[mjfI ] = X
m2I
0 Pr[mjfI ] = 0: (A.12)
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At the same time, it holds
Pr[GjfI ] = Pr[fI jG0]+ Pr[fI jN 0](1  )
(Pr[fI jG0] + Pr[fI jB0])+ 2Pr[fI jN 0](1  )
>
Pr[fI jG0]+ Pr[fI jN 0](1  )
2 Pr[fI jG0]+ 2Pr[fI jN 0](1  ) = 0:5; (A.13)
where the rst equality follows by Bayesrule by the same derivations as in (A.7), and the




The statement of the proposition follows from Claims 1 and 3.
A.3 Guilt aversion: General equilibrium properties
Lemma A.3 A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is bN 0  bB0 :
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists an equilibrium such that
bN 0 < bB0 : (A.14)
Then, by Lemma 4 all types in the interval (bN 0 ;bB0) obtain 0 in state N 0 and induce
investment in state B0. Consequently, these types have a negative utility from any
investment-inducing message in state N 0 (otherwise they would deviate to such message),
and a positive utility from inducing investment in state B0 (otherwise, they would deviate
to ?). Hence, for any 0 2 (bN 0 ;bB0) it holds
U sN 0(
0;b; I) < 0  U sB0(0;b; I); (A.15)
where b is the persuasiveness of investment-inducing messages in states is 2 fB0; N 0g
(unique by Lemma A.1). At the same time, for any  2 (0; ] it holds (given (10))
U sB0(;b; I) = F   b(P   c) < F   0:5b(P   c) = U sN 0(;b; I); (A.16)
which yields a contradiction to (A.15).
Lemma A.4 A necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium is that either bis < 
and U sis(bis ; (m(bis)); I) = 0 or bis =  and U sis(; (m(bis)); I)  0.
Proof. Denote by b the persuasiveness of investment-inducing messages in states
is 2 fB0; N 0g (unique by Lemma A.1). Assume by contradiction that equilibrium exists
and either bis <  and U sis(bis ;b; I) 6= 0 or bis =  and U sis(bis ;b; I) < 0 for some
is 2 fB0; N 0g. Let us demonstrate a contradiction in each of these cases separately.
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Case 1: bis <  and U sis(bis ;b; I) 6= 0:
First, let us consider the case U sis(bis ;b; I) > 0. Then, since U sis(;b; I) is continuously
decreasing in  (see (10)), there would exist types su¢ ciently close to bis such that
 > bis and U sis(;b; I) > 0. At the same time, according to Lemma 4 such types get
the utility of 0 in equilibrium, so that they would have a strict incentive to deviate to
an investment-inducing message yielding the positive utility U sis(;b; I). Analogously, if
U sis(
bis ;b; I) < 0, then types su¢ ciently close to bis on the left have a negative utility from
inducing investment and hence a strict incentive to deviate to refraining from advice. We
have come to contradiction in all possible cases.
Case 2: bis =  and U sis(;b; I) < 0:
Then, analogously to the previous case, there would exist types  such that  < bis and
U sis(;b; I) < 0, which then would like to deviate from sending an investment-inducing
message to refraining that yields a contradiction.




Proof. Denote by b the persuasiveness of investment-inducing messages in states
is 2 fB0; N 0g (unique by Lemma A.1). Assume by contradiction that an equilibrium
exists and bN 0 6= minn; 2bB0o. Let us consider two possible cases bN 0 <  and bN 0 = :
Case 1: bN 0 < . By Lemma A.3 it then follows bB0 < . Consequently, by Lemma
A.4 and equation (10) we have
U sB0(
bB0 ;b; I) = F   bB0b(P   c) = 0; (A.17)
U sN 0(
bN 0 ;b; I) = F   0:5bN 0b(P   c) = 0: (A.18)
This implies
bB0 = Fb(P   c) ; (A.19)bN 0 = F
0:5b(P   c) ; (A.20)
and, consequently, bN 0 = 2bB0 : (A.21)
This, together with bN 0 < , implies minn; 2bB0o = 2bB0, which nally yields a
contradiction to bN 0 6= minn; 2bB0o.








;b; I) = F   0:5b(P   c)
= U sB0(0:5
;b; I) < 0; (A.24)
where the inequality holds due to bB0 < 0:5 by (A.23) and the fact that U sis(;b; I)
is strictly decreasing in . Consequently, types su¢ ciently close to  in state N 0 would
strictly prefer refrainment over an investment-inducing message which contradicts bN 0 = .
A.4 Pooling equilibrium
Lemma A.6 If the strategies and beliefs are specied according to Denition 1, then the
sender has no incentives to deviate if and only if the following two conditions hold:
1) either bPB0 <  and U sB0(bPB0 ; ( m); I) = 0 or bPB0 =  and U sB0(; ( m); I)  0.
2) bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o :
Proof. The necessity of both conditions follows by the arguments given in the proofs of
Lemmas A.4 and A.5. Let us consider their su¢ ciency and assume that both conditions
hold. First, no type in state G0 has an incentive to deviate to refrainment while his utility
from investment F is strictly positive. Second, it is straightforward to show that, once the
rst condition holds, no type in state B0 has a strict incentive to deviate to refrainment
given that U sB0(bPB0 ; ( m); I) is continuously decreasing in its rst argument.
Let us show that all types in state N 0 also do not have incentives to deviate to
refrainment. Consider the following possible cases.
Case 1: bPB0 < 0:5. Then, by assumption, bPN 0 = 2bPB0 < : Hence,
U sN 0(
bPN 0 ; ( m); I) = U sN 0(2bPB0 ; ( m); I)
= F   bPB0( m)(P   c)
= U sB0(
bPB0 ; ( m); I) = 0; (A.25)
where the last equality follows from bPB0 < 0:5 and the rst condition of the lemma.
Then, by the same arguments as in the case of state B0, no sender types in state N 0 have
an incentive to deviate to 0.
Case 2: bPB0  0:5: Then, by assumption, bPN 0 = . This yields
U sN 0(
bPN 0 ; ( m); I) = U sN 0(; ( m); I)
= F   0:5( m)(P   c)
 F   bPB0( m)(P   c)
= U sB0(
bPB0 ; ( m); I)  0; (A.26)
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where the rst inequality follows from bPB0  0:5 and the second one from the rst
condition of the lemma. Then, for all   bPN 0 it holds U sN 0(; ( m); I)  0, so that no
sender type in state N 0 has an incentive to deviate to 0.
Finally, no type in either state has a strict incentive to deviate to out-of-equilibrium
messages which are equally persuasive as m (see Denition 1).
Corollary A.1 In any pooling equilibrium, bPB0 = minn F( m)(P c) ; o.






=  if and only if U sB0(; ( m); I)  0. Then, the
result follows from Lemma A.6.
Lemma A.7 If the strategies and beliefs are specied as in Denition 1 and bPN 0 =
min
n
; 2bPB0o, then U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I) is continuous and strictly decreasing in bPB0 on
(0; ].
Proof. The continuity of U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I) follows from the continuity of ( mjbPB0) inbPB0, given also that bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o is continuous in bPB0. Note that ( mjbPB0) and
hence U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I) are di¤erentiable at all bPB0 2 (0; ] except for bPB0 =  (the
endpoint) and bPB0 = 0:5 (since bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o is not di¤erentiable at this point).
For all other values of bPB0, it holds
dU sB0(








Substituting for U sB0 from (10) we get
dU sB0(
bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I)









Further, consider the following possible cases given that bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o.
Case 1: bPB0 2 (0; 0:5) , bPN 0 = 2bPB0.
Then, by (9) (substituting Pr[ mjG0] = 1, Pr[ mjN 0] = 2bPB0= and Pr[ mjB0] = bPB0=)
( mjbPB0) = 2bPB0(1  ) + bPB0(4  3) +  : (A.29)









( mjbPB0)  ( mj0)bPB0 =
( mjbPB0)  1bPB0 ; (A.31)





( mjbPB0)  1bPB0 +
( mjbPB0)bPB0
=
2( mjbPB0)  1bPB0 =
1bPB0
(   bPB0)bPB0(4  3) +  > 0; (A.32)
where the rst inequality is by (A.31) and the last equality by (A.29). Taken together,
(A.32) and (A.28) lead to the claim for bPB0 2 (0; 0:5).
Case 2: bPB0 2 (0:5; ), bPN 0 = .
In this case, Pr[ mjG0] = 1, Pr[ mjN 0] = 1 and Pr[ mjB0] = bPB0= so that (9) implies
( mjbPB0) = 
bPB0 + (2  ) : (A.33)






(bPB0 + (2  ))2 +
bPB0(bPB0 + (2  ))
=
(2  )2bPB0(bPB0 + (2  ))2 > 0: (A.34)
Taken together, (A.34) and (A.28) lead to the claim for for bPB0 2 (0:5; ).
Finally, since U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I) is continuous at all points as noted in the beginning,
the claim holds for the whole interval (0; ].
Lemma A.8 If the strategies and beliefs are specied as in Denition 1, then for any
given parameter values there always exist unique cuto¤s bPB0 and bPN 0 such that the sender
does not have incentives to deviate. Moreover:
1) If F  0:5(P   c) then bPB0 = bPN 0 = :
2) If F 2 [P c
4  ; 0:5
(P   c)) then bPB0 2 [0:5; ) and bPN 0 = :
3) If F < P c
4  then
bPB0 2 (0; 0:5) and bPN 0 = 2bPB0.
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Proof. For notational simplicity denote
$(bPB0) = U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I) (A.35)
with bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o. Consider the cases listed in the lemma.
Case 1: F  0:5(P   c). Consider the properties of $() at the exterior point .
First, note that
( mjbPB0 = ) = 0:5; (A.36)
which results from substituting Pr[ mjG0] = Pr[ mjN 0] = Pr[ mjB0] = 1 into (9). Then,
$() = F   ( mjbPB0 = )(P   c) = F   0:5(P   c)  0; (A.37)
where the second equality follows from (A.36) and the inequality by the assumption of
the case. Then, the sender has no incentives to deviate if bPB0 = bPN 0 =  by Lemma A.6.
At the same time, it follows from Lemma A.7 and (A.37) that
8 < ;$() > 0: (A.38)
Consequently, by Lemma A.6 there are no possible cuto¤s except for bPB0 = bPN 0 =  such
that the sender does not have an incentive to deviate.
Case 2: F 2 [P c
4  ; 0:5
(P   c)). We have
$(0) = F   0  ( mjbPB0 = 0)(P   c) = F > 0; (A.39)
$() = F   ( mjbPB0 = )(P   c) = F   0:5(P   c) < 0; (A.40)
where the last inequality follows by the assumption of the case. Then, from Lemma
A.7 and the intermediate value theorem it follows that there exists a unique cuto¤ value
0 < bPB0 <  such that $(bPB0) = 0 (the necessary and su¢ cient condition for an interior
cuto¤ by Lemma A.6 ). At the same time, the cuto¤ bPB0 =  is impossible due to (A.40)
and Lemma A.6, so that the existing interior cuto¤ is the only possible cuto¤. Lemma
A.6 also implies that the corresponding unique cuto¤ in state N 0 where the sender does
not have incentives to deviate is then given by bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o.
Let us show that in this case bPB0  0:5. By Lemmas A.7 and A.9 it holds
bPB0  0:5 , $(0:5)  0: (A.41)
From (9) we get
( mjbPB0 = 0:5) = 24   (A.42)
so that
$(0:5) = F   0:5 2
4  (P   c)  0; (A.43)
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where the inequality follows from the assumption F 2 [P c
4  ; 0:5
(P   c)). By (A.41) and
(A.43 ) it then follows that bPB0  0:5.
Case 3: F < P c
4  . From $(0) > 0, $(
) < 0 and Lemmas A.7 and A.6 it follows
that there are unique (interior) cuto¤s bPB0 and bPN 0 with bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o. Finally,
(A.41), the left equality in (A.43) and F < P c
4  result in
bPB0 < 0:5.
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma A.8 shows that for any parameter values there exist
unique cuto¤s bPB0 and bPN 0 such that the sender does not have an incentive to deviate once
the receiver plays according to the prescribed equilibrium strategy. Besides, the receiver
does not have an incentive to deviate from her prescribed strategy after ? by (2). Thus, to
prove the claim of the proposition we need to show that the remaining receivers incentive
constraint
( mjbPB0) > 
(ensuring investment after m) is satised given the unique possible equilibrium cuto¤s bPB0
and bPN 0. By Lemma 5 we have
( m) =
Pr[ mjG0]+ Pr[ mjN 0](1  )
(Pr[ mjG0] + Pr[ mjB0])+ 2Pr[ mjN 0](1  )
 Pr[ mjG
0]+ Pr[ mjN 0](1  )
2 Pr[ mjG0]+ 2Pr[ mjN 0](1  ) = 0:5 > ; (A.44)
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that Pr[ mjB0]  Pr[ mjG0] by Lemma 3,
and the last inequality is by Assumption 1. Hence, the receiver always nds it optimal to
invest after m.
Thus, for any possible cuto¤s bPB0 and bPN 0 where the sender does not have incentives
to deviate (which in turn exist for any parameter values by Lemma A.8) the receiver also
does not have incentives to deviate. Moreover, the values of the cuto¤s in any pooling
equilibrium uniquely determine the senders equilibrium strategy (by Denition 1), and
the receivers equilibrium beliefs and hence strategy. Since these cuto¤ values are unique
by Lemma A.8, any given pooling equilibrium is essentially unique (i.e. all other pooling
equilibria can be di¤erent only in terms of exogenous formulation of m). This completes
the proof.
A.5 Separating equilibrium
Lemma A.9 If the strategies and beliefs are specied according to Denition 2, then the
sender has no incentives to deviate if and only if the following two conditions hold:
1) either bSB0 <  and U sB0(bSB0 ; (em); I) = 0 or bSB0 =  and U sB0(; (em); I)  0.
2) bSN 0 = minn; 2bSB0o :
Proof. Note that no type sending em in states B0 or N 0 has an incentive to deviate to m
(leading to ( m) = 1) due to higher expected guilt. At the same time, all types in state
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G0 strictly prefer m over em by lexicographic preferences (Assumption 2). The subsequent
proof is based on the same arguments as the proof of Lemma A.6 for the case of the
pooling equilibrium.
Corollary A.2 In any separating equilibrium, bSB0 = minn F(em)(P c) ; o.





=  if and only if U sB0(; (em); I)  0. Then, the
result follows from Lemma A.9.
Lemma A.10 If the strategies and beliefs are specied as in Denition 2 and bSN 0 =
min
n
; 2bSB0o, then U sB0(bSB0 ; (emjbSB0); I) is continuous and strictly decreasing in bSB0 on
(0; ].
Proof. As in the case of the pooling equilibrium (see (A.27)-(A.28)), U sB0(bSB0 ; (emjbSB0); I)
is continuous in bSB0, while
dU sB0(
bSB0 ; (emjbSB0); I)









for any bSB0 2 (0; ] except for bSB0 = 0:5 and bSB0 = . Consider the following possible
cases given that bSN 0 = minn; 2bSB0o.
Case 1: bSB0 2 (0; 0:5) , bSN 0 = 2bSB0.
Then, by (9) (substituting Pr[emjG0] = 0, Pr[emjN 0] = 2bSB0= and Pr[emjB0] = bSB0=)
(emjbSB0) = 2(1  )4  3 ; (A.46)
i.e. is constant. Thus,
@(emjbSB0)
@bSB0 = 0 (A.47)
that together with (A.45) leads to the claim for bSB0 2 (0; 0:5).
Case 2: bSB0 2 (0:5; ), bSN 0 = .
In this case, Pr[emjG0] = 0, Pr[emjN 0] = 1 and Pr[emjB0] = bSB0= so that (9) implies
(emjbSB0) = (1  )
2(1  ) + bSB0 : (A.48)
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=   (1  )

(bSB0 + 2(1  ))2 +
(1  )bSB0(bSB0 + 2(1  ))
=
2(1  )22bSB0(bSB0 + 2(1  ))2 > 0: (A.49)
By (A.49) and (A.45) the claim follows (for bSB0 2 (0:5; )).
Finally, since (emjbSB0), and hence U sB0(bSB0 ; (emjbSB0); I), is continuous at any bSB0 2
(0; ] the claim holds for the whole interval (0; ].
Lemma A.11 If the strategies and beliefs are specied as in Denition 2, then for any
given parameter values there always exist unique cuto¤s bSB0 and bSN 0 such that the sender
does not have incentives to deviate. Moreover:
1) If F  (1 )(P c)
2  then
bSB0 = bSN 0 = :







then bSB0 2 [0:5; ) and bSN 0 = :
3) If F <
(1 )(P c)
4 3 then
bSB0 2 (0; 0:5) and bSN 0 = 2bSB0.
Proof. The proof proceeds analogously to the case of the pooling equilibrium. For
notational simplicity denote
(bSB0) = U sB0(bSB0 ; (emjbSB0); I) (A.50)
with bSN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o. Consider the cases listed in the lemma.
Case 1: F  (1 )(P c)
2  . Consider the behavior of () at the exterior point  . We
have
(emjbSB0 = ) = 1  2  ; (A.51)
which results from substituting Pr[emjG0] = 0 and Pr[ mjN 0] = Pr[ mjB0] = 1 into (9).
Then,
() = F   (emjbSB0 = )(P   c) = F   1  2  (P   c)  0; (A.52)
where the second equality follows from (A.51) and the inequality by the assumption of
the case. Then, the sender has no incentives to deviate if bSB0 = bSN 0 =  by Lemma A.9.
At the same time, it follows from Lemma A.10 and (A.52) that
8 < ; () > 0: (A.53)
Consequently, by Lemma A.9 there are no possible cuto¤s except for bSB0 = bSN 0 =  such
that the sender does not have incentives to deviate.
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(0) = F   0  (emjbSB0 = 0)(P   c) = F > 0; (A.54)
() = F   (emjbSB0 = )(P   c) = F   1  2  (P   c) < 0; (A.55)
where the second equality follows by (A.51), and the inequality follows by the assumption
of the case. Then, from Lemma A.10 and the intermediate value theorem it follows that
there exists a unique cuto¤ value 0 < bSB0 <  such that (bSB0) = 0 (the necessary and
su¢ cient condition for an interior cuto¤ by Lemma A.9). At the same time, the cuto¤bSB0 =  is impossible due to (A.55) and Lemma A.9, so that the existing interior cuto¤ is
the only possible cuto¤. Lemma A.9 also implies that the corresponding unique cuto¤ in
state N 0 is then given by bSN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o.
Let us show that in this case bSB0  0:5. By Lemmas A.10 and A.9 it holds
bSB0  0:5 , (0:5)  0: (A.56)
From (9) we get
(emjbSB0 = 0:5) = 2(1  )4  3 (A.57)
so that
(0:5) = F   0:52(1  )
4  3 (P   c)  0; (A.58)








and (A.58) it then follows that bSB0  0:5.
Case 3: F <
(1 )(P c)
4 3 . From (0) > 0, (
) < 0 and Lemmas A.10 and A.9
it follows that there are unique interior cuto¤s bSB0 and bSN 0 with bSN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o.




Proof of Proposition 4. To show the claim of the proposition we need to nd the range
of parameters such that the receivers incentive constraints are satised given the unique
equilibrium cuto¤s bSB0 and bSN 0 where the sender does not have incentives to deviate,
which always exist by Lemma A.11 (in which case the obtained separating equilibrium
will be essentially unique given the unique values of the cuto¤s). Clearly, since message
m is sent by the sender only if he has indeed observed the good state of the world, it
holds ( m) = 1 > , so that the receiver always prefers to invest after m. Let us consider
the remaining incentive constraint which ensures investment after em
(emjbSB0) >  =   cP   c: (A.59)
We consider this constraint in three possible parameter cases according to Lemma A.11.
Case 1: F  (1 )(P c)
2  and
bSB0 = bSN 0 = :
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By (A.51) we have
(emjbSB0 = ) = 1  2   (A.60)
so that
(emjbSB0 = ) >   cP   c ,  < P + cP : (A.61)







, bSB0 2 [0:5; ) and bSN 0 = :
Substituting for (emjbSB0) given that bSN 0 =  we get
(emjbSB0) = (1  )
(1  )2 + bSB0 : (A.62)













2(1  ) + bSB02 < 0: (A.64)
Consider the second term. By the implicit function theorem and the fact that (bSB0) = 0






@=@bSB0 > 0; (A.65)




Given continuity of (emjbSB0), we obtain that it is strictly decreasing on [0:5; ): Then,
under considered range of parameters, (emjbSB0) obtains its highest value if F = (1 )(P c)4 3
so that, correspondingly, bSB0 = 0:5 (see ( A.58)). In this case




4  3  
,   2(P + c)
2P + c
; (A.68)
then for any F in the considered parameter range the incentive constraint (emjbSB0) > 
is violated.
At the same time, by (A.64) (emjbSB0) is bounded from below by its value at bSB0 = .
In this case,
(emjbSB0 = ) = 1  2  : (A.69)
Consequently, if
1  
2   > 
,  < P + c
P
; (A.70)
then for any F in the considered case the incentive constraint (emjbSB0) >  is satised.








(emjbSB0 = 0:5) = 2(1  )4  3 > ; (A.71)
(emjbSB0 = ) = 1  2    . (A.72)
This, together with (A.64) and the intermediate value theorem, implies that there
exists a threshold value of bSB0 2 (0:5; ] such that the incentive constraint binds, i.e.
(emjbSB0) = . This equality yields
(emjbSB0) = (1  )
(1  )2 + bSB0 =  
c
P   c;
bSB0 = (P + c)(1  ) c : (A.73)
Substituting this into (bSB0) we get










which together with the cuto¤ condition (bSB0) = 0 (see Lemma A.9) implies that the
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value of F which leads to (emjbSB0) =  is




Then, since (emjbSB0) decreases with F in the considered case by (A.66), the receivers







, if and only if




Note also that for the considered range of  it holds




(1  )(P   c)
2   ;
i.e. (A.76) is a binding constraint in Case 2.
In sum, in Case 2 the receivers incentive constraints are satised whenever  < P+c
P







and F <  (P + c) (1 )

.
Case 3: F <
(1 )(P c)
4 3 ,
bSB0 2 (0; 0:5) and bSN 0 = 2bSB0.
Substituting Pr[emjG0] = 0, Pr[emjN 0] = 2bSB0= and Pr[emjB0] = bSB0= into (9) we get
(emjbSB0) = 2(1  )4  3 : (A.77)
Then,
2(1  )
4  3 >  =  
c
P   c
, 0 <  < 2(P + c)
2P + c
; (A.78)
determining the parameter range where the incentive constraint (A.59) holds.
Merging Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 together, we obtain that an (essentially unique)
separating equilibrium exists if and only if either of the following holds:
Case 1:
F 
(1  )(P   c)






(1  )(P   c)
4  3 ;
(1  )(P   c)
2  






(1  )(P   c)
4  3 ;


















(1  )(P   c)
4  3

^  < 2(P + c)
2P + c
:
This is equivalent to the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 6. Given that bPN 0 = minn; 2bPB0o and bSN 0 = minn; 2bSB0o (by
Lemmas A.6 and A.9), it is su¢ cient to show the claim for bSB0 and bPB0. We have that in
a pooling equilibrium for any bPB0
( mjbPB0)  0:5 (A.79)
(see (A.44)). At the same time, in a separating equilibrium
(emjbSB0) = Pr[Gjem] = Pr[GjN 0 \ em] Pr[N 0jem] + Pr[GjB0 \ em] Pr[B0jem]
= 0:5Pr[N 0jem] < 0:5; (A.80)
because at least some types in state B0 send em so that Pr[N 0jem] < 1. (A.79) and (A.80)
yield
( mjbPB0) > (emjbSB0) (A.81)
so that
U sB0(
bPB0 ; (emjbSB0); I) > U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I): (A.82)
If bPB0 <  so that U sB0(bPB0 ; ( mjbPB0); I) = 0 by Lemma A.6, then (A.82) implies
U sB0(
bPB0 ; (emjbSB0); I) > 0: (A.83)
Then, bSB0 > bPB0 by Lemma A.9 and the fact that U sB0(; (emjbSB0); I) is decreasing in the
rst argument.
In the other case, if bPB0 = , by (A.82) and Lemma A.6
U sB0(
; (emjbSB0); I) > 0: (A.84)
Consequently, all types in state B0 prefer to send em in a separating equilibrium and the
only possible equilibrium cuto¤ is bSB0 = .
A.6 Other equilibria under guilt aversion
Lemma A.12 If any two equilibria are characterized by the same persuasiveness of
investment-inducing messages in states is 2 fB0; N 0g (in the sense of Lemma A.1), then
these equilibria are payo¤-equivalent.
Proof. Denote by b the persuasiveness of messages used in states is 2 fB0; N 0g (unique
by Lemma A.1). We need to show that, if in any two equilibria b is the same, then all
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sender types in all states and the receiver have the same distribution of payo¤s in both
equilibria.
Claim 1. The cuto¤s bB0 and bN 0 do not di¤er between the equilibria.
Proof. Assume the opposite by contradiction. Then, given that bN 0 is uniquely
determined by bB0 by Lemma A.5, at least in one equilibrium it must hold bB0 < 
(denote this cuto¤ as bB01). Then, by Lemma A.4 it should hold
U sB0(
bB01;b; I) = 0;
which gives
8 < bB01; U sB0(;b; I) > 0;
8 > bB01; U sB0(;b; I) < 0:
Then, by Lemma A.4 no equilibrium can have a cuto¤ in state B0 di¤erent from bB01 givenb, which yields a contradiction.
Claim 2. The equilibria are payo¤-equivalent for the receiver.
Proof. The receivers distribution of payo¤s for given sender type  and information
state is depends only on the receivers action and the state is (since the distribution of the
state of the world is uniquely determined by is). At the same time, the correspondence
of receivers actions to sender types (except for the zero measured cuto¤ types) in each
information state is is uniquely determined by the cuto¤ in this state (by Lemmas 4 and
A.2). Since the cuto¤s do not di¤er between the equilibria, the claim holds.
Claim 3. The equilibria are payo¤-equivalent for the sender.
Consider any given senders type  in an information state is. Note rst that the
cuto¤s bPis for is 2 fB0; N 0g are the same between the equilibria by Claim 1. Then, we
can have the following cases:
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  > bPis , then by Lemma 4 the sender obtains 0 in both
equilibria.
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  < bPis , then by Lemma 4 and (10) the sender obtains the
same expected payo¤ of F   isb(P   c) in both equilibria.
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  = bPis < , then the sender must be indi¤erent between 0 and
sending an investment-inducing message, and thus expects 0 in either equilibrium.
- If is 2 fB0; N 0g while  = bPis = , then the sender is either again indi¤erent
between 0 and sending an investment-inducing message, or has a strictly positive utility
from inducing investment in both equilibria obtaining the same expected payo¤ of
F   isb(P   c).
- If is = G0, then by Lemma 3 the sender always obtains F in both equilibria.
Hence, any given senders type in any information state has the same expected utility
in both equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Claim 1. There can exist only two types of equilibria:
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- where all types in state G0 pool with types in the other states (Type 1);
- where no type in state G0 pools with types in the other states (Type 2).
Proof. The claim is equivalent to showing that there exists no equilibrium where some
types in state G0 pool with types in the other states (i.e. send a message which is also
chosen by some types in states B0 or N 0), and some types in state G0 separate from types
in the other states (i.e. do not send such a message). Assume by contradiction that this is
the case. By Lemma 3, any separating type in state G0 must also send a message. Hence,
there exists at least one message m0 sent by such types such that (m0) = 1. Then, this
must hold for any m sent in state G0 since otherwise the types sending messages with a
lower persuasiveness in state G0 would like to deviate to m0 by lexicographic preferences
(Assumption 2).
Next, note that by Lemma A.1 all investment-inducing messages sent in states B0 and
N 0 should have the same persuasiveness 0. Since at least some types in states B0 and N 0
choose messages sent in state G0 by assumption (and hence induce  = 1 by the previous
argument), we must have 0 = 1. This implies that all types in states B0 and N 0 who send
an investment-inducing message must pool at message(s) sent by types in state G0, while
any such message must be sent by a zero measure of types in states B0 and N 0 (to ensure
0 = 1). Thus, denoting the set of all messages inducing investment and sent by types in
states B0 and N 0 by I;fB0;N 0g, we have
8m 2 I;fB0;N 0g: Pr[mj:G0] = 0: (A.85)
Denote the event that m 2 I;fB0;N 0g as eI;fB0;N 0g. Denote the set of types in state
is 2 fB0; N 0g who send an investment-inducing message by I;is . Denote the event that
 2 >;is in the senders information state is 2 fB0; N 0g by eI;fB0;N 0g. Then,




Pr[Gjm \ :G0] Pr[mj:G0] (A.87)
= 0; (A.88)
where the rst equality is by construction of the events, the second equality follows by the
law of total probability and the countability of the message space, and the last equality
follows from (A.85). Yet, Pr[GjeI;fB0;N 0g] = 0 contradicts to the fact that the good state
has a positive probability in case of is = N 0 while a positive measure of types in this
informational state induce investment by Lemma 4. Hence, the constructed equilibrium
does not exist.
Claim 2. If an equilibrium is of Type 1 in the sense of Claim 1, then it is payo¤-
equivalent to a pooling equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium  of Type 1, where all types in state G0 pool with
types in the other states. By Lemma A.1 all investment-inducing messages in states B0
and N 0 have the same persuasiveness 0. Then, all types in state G0 must induce the same
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persuasiveness as well. Indeed, assume by contradiction that this is not the case, i.e.
there exists at least one type 0 in state G0 who sends a message m0 such that (m0) 6= 0.
Then, at least some types in states B0 and N 0 must send m0 as well since the equilibrium
is of Type 1 by assumption. Yet, this contradicts Lemma A.1 due to (m0) 6= 0.
Next, denote the equilibrium cuto¤s by bxB0 and bxN 0 (in the sense of Lemma 4 ).
Consider a messaging strategy of the sender denoted by  such that all types in state
is 2 fB0; N 0g with   bxis and all types in state G0 pool on the same message mx, and the
remaining types (if any) refrain from advice. Let us show that if such strategy is played
in equilibrium, then ( mx) = 0.
Indeed, denote by is the set of all types in state is 2 fB0; N 0; G0g inducing investment
by sending a message in equilibrium . Denote the event that  2 is in the senders
information state is by e . Denote the set of all investment-inducing messages in
equilibrium  by I and the event that m 2 I in this equilibrium as fI . Note that
in equilibrium  the event e occurs if and only if the event fI occurs so that
Pr[Gje] = Pr[GjfI ]: (A.89)
At the same time, we have
Pr[Gjmx] = Pr[Gje] = Pr[GjfI ] = X
m2I




Pr[Gjm] Pr[mjfI ] = X
m2I
0 Pr[mjfI ] = 0, (A.90)
where the rst equality is by construction of mx, the second equality is by (A.89), the
third equality is by the law of total probability and the fact that the message set is
countable, the fourth equality is by the fact that any investment-inducing message m0 is
sent if and only if m0 2 I by construction, and the fth equality is by the fact that all
investment-inducing messages have the same persuasiveness 0 as shown above.
Next, consider a putative equilibrium  0 where the sender plays , the receiver responds
to mx with investment, and to ? with investment if and only if (?) > , while all out-
of-equilibrium messages induce receivers beliefs equal to ( mx). Let us show that this is
indeed an equilibrium. First, note that all types in state G0 clearly nd it optimal to send
mx. Consider types in states B0 and N 0. For any is 2 fB0; N 0g it must hold
8  bxis : U sis(; 0; I)  0;
8 > bxis : U sis(; 0; I) < 0
since otherwise the senders incentive constraints in equilibrium  would be violated (by
Lemma 4). Consequently, given (A.90), the incentive constraints of the sender in states
B0 and N 0 in equilibrium  0 are also satised. Besides, the receiver would prefer to invest
after mx (since the level of persuasiveness Pr[Gjmx] = 0 must be above  as otherwise 0
would not induce investment in equilibrium ). Consequently,  0 constitutes an existing
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pooling equilibrium. Moreover, it is payo¤-equivalent to equilibrium  by Lemma A.12
since both  and  0 are characterized by the same persuasiveness of investment-inducing
messages in states is 2 fB0; N 0g.
Claim 3. If an equilibrium is of Type 2 in the sense of Claim 1, then it is payo¤-
equivalent to a separating equilibrium.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium  of Type 2, where all types in state G0 separate from
the types in the other states. Again, by Lemma A.1 all investment-inducing messages in
states B0 and N 0 should have the same persuasiveness 0, while all types in state G0 must
induce  = 1 since the equilibrium is assumed to be of Type 2.
Consider a messaging strategy of the sender denoted by 0 such that all types in state
is 2 fB0; N 0g with   bxis pool on the same message emx, the remaining types in these
states (if any) refrain from advice, and types in state G0 separate with another message
mx. By the same argument as in Case 1 (redening is as the set of types sending
an investment-inducing message in states B0 and N 0, and I as the set of investment-
inducing messages in states B0 and N 0), we obtain (emx) = 0. Thus, strategy 0 leads
to the same persuasiveness of investment-inducing messages as in equilibrium . The
remaining argument is analogous to Case 1 and is omitted.
The statement of the proposition follows jointly from Claims 1-3.
A.7 Welfare comparison
Lemma A.13 Both bPB0 and bSB0 are continuous in F 2 (0;1) and  2 (0; 1).
Proof.
Claim 1. bPB0 is continuous in F 2 (0;1).
Proof. Step 1. Consider bPB0 and its continuity in F . Note that ( mjbPB0) is
continuously di¤erentiable in bPB0 on both intervals (0; 0:5) and (0:5; ) by (A.29) and
(A.33), respectively. Hence, $(bPB0) is continuously di¤erentiable in both F and bPB0 oncebPB0 belongs to these intervals. Consequently, by the implicit function theorem (given the















Hence, we are left to show that bPB0 is continuous in F at P c4  and 0:5(P   c), which is
done in Steps 2 and 3, respectively.
Step 2. Let us show that bPB0(F ) is continuous at F = P c4  . By Lemma A.8 together
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with (A.29) and (A.33) we obtain:
( mjbPB0) =
8<: 
0(bPB0)  2bPB0 (1 )+bPB0 (4 3)+ if F < P c4  ;
00(bPB0)  
bPB0+(2 ) if F  P c4  :
(A.91)
Furthermore, by Corollary A.1 and the fact that bPB0 <  at F = P c4  by Lemma A.8, we
have bPB0 = F
( mjbPB0)(P   c) : (A.92)




0(bPB0 )(P c) if F < P c4  ;
F




    lim
F! P c
4 





















   yields the only positive solution
 !
   = 0:5.
Similarly, denoting
 !
 +  lim
F! P c
4 






























This proves that bPB0(F ) is continuous at F = P c4  .
Step 3. Let us show that bPB0(F ) is continuous at F = 0:5(P   c).
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00(bPB0 )(P c) if F 2 [P c4  ; 0:5(P   c))
 if F  0:5(P   c)
: (A.96)
Note that by Lemma A.8, the condition bPB0 <  and hence (A.92) still hold for
















   yields the only positive solution
 !
   = . Hence,
lim
0:5(P c) 
bPB0 =  = lim
0:5(P c)+
bPB0 ;
where the last equality is by (A.96). Consequently, bPB0(F ) is continuous at F =
0:5(P   c).
Claim 2. bPB0 is continuous in  2 (0; 1).
Note that the claim follows trivially if F  0:5(P   c), since then bPB0 =  for any 
by Lemma A.8.
Consider F < 0:5(P   c) so that bPB0 < . Note that ( mjbPB0) is continuously
di¤erentiable in bPB0 and  for bPB0 2 (0; 0:5) [ (0:5; ) and  2 (0; 1) by (A.29) and
(A.33), respectively. The same holds for $(bPB0). Consequently, by the implicit function
theorem (given the equilibrium condition $(bPB0) = 0 for bPB0 <  by Lemma A.6), bPB0 is















Hence, we are left to show that bPB0 is continuous in  if F = P c4  ()  =
(4F   (P   c))=F . This follows by the same arguments as in Step 2 in the proof of
Claim 1.
Claim 3. bSB0 is continuous in F 2 (0;1) and  2 (0; 1).
Proof. The proof proceeds by the same arguments as the proofs of Claims 1 and 2,
and hence is omitted.
Corollary A.3 Both bPN 0 and bSN 0 are continuous in F 2 (0;1) and  2 (0; 1).
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Proof. The claim immediately follows from Proposition A.13 and the fact that bN 0 =
min
n
; 2bB0o by Lemma A.5.
Lemma A.14 If at least some sender types refrain from advice in equilibrium, then:
(i) the receiver invests conditional on ? in the pooling equilibrium if and only if
 < P+c
P
and F < eF P where eF P 2  0; P c
4 

is some threshold value.
(ii) the receiver invests conditional on ? in the separating equilibrium if and only if
 < P+c
P
and F < eF S where eF S 2 0; (1 )(P c)
4 3

is some threshold value.
Proof. (i) First, note that the receiver never invests after ? (if on the equilibrium path)
if bPN 0 = , since then only types in state B0 refrain in equilibrium so that (?) = 0.




Pr[?jG0]+ Pr[?jN 0](1  )
(Pr[?jG0] + Pr[?jB0])+ 2Pr[?jN 0](1  ) : (A.98)
Substituting Pr[?jG0] = 0, Pr[?jN 0] = ( bPN 0)=, Pr[?jB0] = ( bPB0)=, and bPN 0 = 2bPB0
(due to Lemma A.5 and bPN 0 < ) into (A.98) yields
(?jbPB0) = (1  )(   2bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bPB0 : (A.99)

















(2  )  bPB0(4  3)2 < 0: (A.102)
Consider the second term. By the implicit function theorem and the fact that $(bPB0) = 0






@$=@bPB0 > 0; (A.103)
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where the last inequality follows by Lemma A.7 and the fact that $ is di¤erentiable inbPB0 on (0; 0:5). Finally, (A.101)-(A.103) lead to (A.100).






(mG0jbPB0)(P   c) = 0; (A.104)
where the rst equality follows from Corollary A.1 and the last equality follows from the
fact that (mG0jbPB0)  0:5 by (A.44) and hence bounded from 0. Consequently,
lim
F!0
(?jbPB0) = limbPB0!0 (1  )(   2
bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bPB0 =
1  
2  : (A.105)
Expressions (A.100) and (A.105) yield that 1 
2  is the upper bound of (?jbPB0) as F ! 0.
At the same time, we have
1  
2       
c




Consequently, for any   P+c
P
we have (?jbPB0) <  for any F > 0, so that the receiver
never invests after ?.





(?jbPB0) = 1  2   > ; (A.107)
where the equality is by (A.105) and the inequality is by (A.106). Besides, given that bPB0
converges to 0:5 as F ! P c
4  (by (A.43) and the continuity of





(?jbPB0) = limbPB0!0:5 (1  )(   2
bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bPB0 = 0 < : (A.108)
By (A.100), (A.107), (A.108) and the intermediate value theorem for any  < P+c
P
there
must exist a threshold value eF P 2  0; P c
4 

such that it should hold (?jbPB0)   for any
F 2
h eF P ; P c
4 
i
, and (?jbPB0) >  for any F 2 0; eF P. Since furthermore F  P c4 
is excluded due to bPN 0 <  and Lemma A.8, the incentive constraint (?jbPB0) >  under
 < P+c
P
holds if and only if F < eF P . This together with the previously established fact
that (?jbPB0) <  for   P+cP leads to the claim.
(ii) First, note that the receiver never invests after ? (if on the equilibrium path)
if bSN 0 = , since then only types in state B0 refrain in equilibrium so that (?) = 0.
Consider the remaining case bSN 0 < . By the same argument as in the proof of point (i),
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we obtain
(?jbSB0) = (1  )(   2bSB0)










(mN 0jbSB0)(P   c) = 0; (A.111)
where the last equality holds since (mN 0jbSB0) is constant by (A.77). Then, by the
analogous arguments as in the proof of point (i), there must exist a threshold valueeF S 2 0; (1 )(P c)
4 3





Lemma A.15 (i) A pooling equilibrium is unresponsive if and only if either of the
following holds:
 F  0:5(P   c),
  < P+c
P
and F < eF P , where eF P 2  0; P c
4 

is some threshold value.
(ii) A separating equilibrium is unresponsive if and only if either of the following holds:
 F  (1 )(P c)
2  ,
  < P+c
P
and F < eF S, where eF S 2 0; (1 )(P c)
4 3

is some threshold value.
(iii) If an equilibrium is unresponsive, then the receiver obtains an expected payo¤ of
0:5(P + c). Any responsive equilibrium yields a strictly higher expected payo¤.
Proof. (i),(ii): By Lemma A.5 a pooling or separating equilibrium can be unresponsive
only in two cases:
Case 1: bPB0 = , i.e. the sender always sends an investment-inducing message. This
condition holds if and only if F  0:5(P   c) in the pooling equilibrium, and if and only
F  (1 )(P c)
2  in the separating equilibrium.
Case 2: bPB0 <  while (?) > , i.e. the receiver invests conditional on any senders
action in equilibrium. The corresponding necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this case
are given by Lemma A.14.
Combining Cases 1 and 2 together leads to statements (i) and (ii) of the lemma.
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(iii) Denote the receivers payo¤ in an unresponsive equilibrium as U r. Then, by the
law of total probability
E[U r] = Pr[I \G]P + Pr[I \B]c
= Pr[G]P + Pr[B]c
= 0:5(P + c); (A.112)
where the second inequality is by the fact that the receiver always chooses investment.
Next, consider any responsive equilibrium. By Proposition 5 it must be payo¤-
equivalent to either pooling or separating equilibrium. Hence, without loss of generality
assume that the equilibrium is either of these types. Since the equilibrium is assumed
to be responsive, the receiver must invest conditional on no refrainment, and abstain
conditional on refrainment. Denote the event that the sender chooses to refrain from
advice in the considered equilibrium as e?. Then,
E[U r] = E[U r(I)j:e?] Pr[:e?] + 0  Pr[e?]
> E[U r(I)j:e?] Pr[:e?] + E[U r(I)je?] Pr[e?]
= E[U r(I)]
= 0:5(P + c)
= E[U r]; (A.113)
where the rst equality is by the law of total probability, the inequality follows from
E[U r(I)je?] < 0 since the receiver prefers to abstain conditional on the sender refraining
in equilibrium, and the last equality is by (A.112).
Thus, all unresponsive equilibria yield for the receiver the same expected payo¤ of
0:5(P + c), while all responsive equilibria have a strictly higher expected payo¤. This
leads to the claim.
Lemma A.16 eF P > eF S:
Proof. Assume by contradiction that eF P  eF S. Consider some F 2 h eF P ; eF Si and some
 < P+c
P
such that both pooling and separating equilibria exist (by Propositions 3 and 4),
while eF P and eF S are well-dened by Lemma A.15. By Lemma A.15 it holds
eF S < (1  )(P   c)
4  3 : (A.114)
Then, by (A.114) and Lemma A.11,
bSN 0 < : (A.115)
Consequently, by Lemma 6, we must have
bPN 0 < bSN 0 < : (A.116)
58
In turn, this implies:
(?jbPB0)    (?jbSB0); (A.117)
where the inequalities follow from F 2
h eF P ; eF Si,  < P+c
P
and Lemma A.14 (taking into
account that (?jbxB0) =  if F = eF x, x = P; S, which in turn follows from the continuity
of (?jbxB0) in bxB0 and hence in F by Lemma A.13).
Next, by (A.116) function (?jbB0) is generally given by
(?jbB0) = (1  )(   2bB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bB0
in both equilibria (see (A.99) and (A.109)). Note that the right-hand side is strictly
decreasing in bB0 by (A.102 ). Consequently, since bPN 0 < bSN 0 by (A.116) we obtain
(?jbSB0) < (?jbPB0) which contradicts (A.117).
Proof of Proposition 6. Denote the interval of F for which the separating equilibrium
exists for given  as (). Note that () is empty if and only if   2(P+c)
2P+c
by Proposition
4. Denote further the ex ante receivers utility in the pooling equilibrium as U r;P and in
the separating equilibrium as U r;S. Denote (F )  U r;P (F )  U r;S(F ). Note that (F )
is well-dened if and only if F 2 () (given that the pooling equilibrium always exists
by Proposition 3).





so that () is nonempty. There can be only three
possible cases:
- (F )  0 for all F 2 ();
- (F )  0 for all F 2 () ;
- there exists a threshold F  2 () such that (F )  0 if F 2 () and F  F 
(while (F ) < 0 for some F ), and (F )  0 if F 2 () and F > F  (while (F ) > 0
for some F ).
Proof. Let us consider properties of (F ) under two parameter cases depending on
whether the receiver invests conditional on ?.
Case 1. F < eF P and  < P+c
P
.
In this case, both equilibria exist while the pooling equilibrium is unresponsive by
Lemma A.15(i). Then, by Lemma A.15(iii) the separating equilibrium must yield a
















^ F  eF P.




^ F  eF P,
then F > eF S by Lemma A.16. Consequently, by Lemma A.14 in Case 2 the receiver must
abstain conditional on ? in both equilibria (if on the equilibrium path). Hence, the ex
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ante receivers utility given any equilibrium cuto¤s bB0 and bN 0 is





















= (0:5P + 0:5c
bB0

) + (1  )
bN 0

(0:5P + 0:5c); (A.118)
where the second equality is by the law of total probability, the third equality is by the
fact that sender messages in equilibrium (and hence the receivers actions) do not depend
on the true state of the world once his information state is is conditioned upon, and the
fourth equality is obtained by substituting Pr[IjG0] = 1, Pr[IjN 0] = bN0 , Pr[IjB0] = bB0 ,
Pr[G0jG] = Pr[B0jB] = , Pr[G0jB] = Pr[B0jG] = 0, and Pr[N 0jG] = Pr[N 0jB] = 1  .
By Lemma 6 we have the following possible equilibrium cases: 1) bSN 0 <  and bPN 0 < ;
2) bSN 0 =  and bPN 0 < ; 3) bSN 0 =  and bPN 0 = . Let us consider these cases sequentially.
Case 2.1: bSN 0 <  and bPN 0 < .
By (A.118) and bN 0 = 2bB0 (by Lemmas A.6 and A.9) we obtain
(F ) = U r;P   U r;S = (0:5P + 0:5c
bPB0















(bPB0   bSB0) + (1  )P + c (bPB0   bSB0)
= (bPB0   bSB0)(0:5c+ (1  )(P + c) ): (A.119)
By Lemma 6 the rst term in the RHS is strictly negative. At the same time, the second
term is strictly positive given that  < 2(P+c)
2P+c
by assumption. Consequently, in Case 2.1
(F ) < 0: (A.120)
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Case 2.2: bSN 0 =  and bPN 0 < .
For this case, let us just show that  strictly increases in F . Indeed, by (A.118), given
that bPN 0 = 2bPB0 and bSN 0 = , we have
(F ) = U r;P   U r;S = (0:5P + 0:5c
bPB0













+ (P (1  ) + c(1  0:5))
bPB0

 (1  )(0:5P + 0:5c): (A.121)


















are strictly positive (where these
derivatives exist). Besides, the term P (1   ) + c(1   0:5) is strictly positive since
 < 2(P+c)
2P+c
by assumption. Hence, by (A.122), where @
@F
exists, it is strictly positive.
Finally, since (F ) is continuous in both cuto¤s and hence in F by Lemma A.13, while
being also di¤erentiable in F at a given cuto¤ unless this cuto¤ takes values of 0:5 or 
(see the proof of Lemma A.13), we obtain that in Case 2.2  strictly increases in F .
Case 2.3: bSN 0 =  and bPN 0 = .
By (A.118) we obtain
(F ) = U r;P   U r;S = (0:5P + 0:5c
bPB0








(bPB0   bSB0)  0; (A.123)
where the last inequality is by Lemma 6.
Finally, let us combine Case 1, and Cases 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 together. Let us denote
the intervals of F corresponding to these cases for given  as 1(), 21(), 22() and
23(), respectively. Since by Proposition 4 the separating equilibrium exists if and only
if either of the conditions for Case 1 or for Case 2 is satised (and the pooling equilibrium
always exists by Proposition 3), these intervals cover the range of all possible values
of F where both pooling and separating equilibria simultaneously exist for given , i.e.
() = 1() [ 21()[ 22() [ 23(). Note also that since bB0 and hence bN 0 are
continuously increasing in F in either equilibrium by (A.103), (A.65) and Lemma A.13,
we must have that 21() (if nonempty) lies to the left of 22() (if nonempty), which in
turn lies to the left of 23() (if nonempty). Besides, by construction, 1 (if nonempty)
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must lie to the left of any of the other intervals. At the same time, from the above analysis
of the cases we have
8F 2 1 : (F )  0; (A.124)
8F 2 21 : (F ) < 0; (A.125)
8F 2 22 :  strictly increases in F; (A.126)
8F 2 23 : (F )  0 (A.127)
This together with the disposition of the intervals described above leads to Claim 1.





so that () is nonempty. Then, there exists a
value of F > 0 within () such that (F ) < 0.
Proof. In what follows, we refer to Cases 1 and 2.1-2.3 from the proof of Claim 1.
Consider rst  < P+c
P
. Then, by Propositions 3 and 4, both the pooling and the
separating equilibrium exist for any F . Consider any F 0 2
 eF S; eF P, which should exist
by Lemma A.16. Moreover, set F to be su¢ ciently close to eF S so that
F <
(1  )(P   c)
4  3
(which is feasible by Lemma A.15). Consequently, by Lemma A.11
bSB0 < . (A.128)
Then, since F 0 < eF P , the pooling equilibrium is unresponsive (by Lemma A.15). At the
same time, it follows from F 0 > eF S and Lemma A.14 that the receiver should abstain
conditional on refrainment in the separating equilibrium (if on the equilibrium path),
which together with (A.128) implies that the separating equilibrium is responsive. Then,
(F ) < 0 by Lemma A.15(iii).







. Then, by Proposition 4 the separating
equilibrium exists if and only if F <  (P + c) (1 )

. Moreover, by Lemmas A.8
and Lemma A.11 the conditions for Case 2.1 in the proof of Claim 1 (including the
general parameter restrictions for Case 2) will then be satised for su¢ ciently small
F 2

0;  (P + c) (1 )


. For such values of F it will hold (F ) < 0 by (A.125).





so that () is nonempty. Then, there exists a
value of F > 0 within () such that (F ) > 0.
Proof. Consider rst  < P+c
P
. Then, by Propositions 3 and 4, both





eF Po ; 0:5(P   c). Then, by Lemmas A.8, A.11 and A.14 we havebSB0 = bSN 0 = , i.e. the separating equilibrium is unresponsive, while bPB0 < bPN 0   and
the receiver abstains after ? in the pooling equilibrium (i.e. the pooling equilibrium is
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responsive). Then, (F ) > 0 by Lemma A.15(iii).







. Then, by Proposition 4 the separating
equilibrium exists if and only if F <  (P + c) (1 )

. At the same time, if F goes to
 (P + c) (1 )

, then (em) converges to  (by (A.75) and the fact that (em) is continuous
in bSB0 and hence in F by Lemma A.13). Consequently, the receivers utility conditional
on em is going to 0. Then, in the limit the only ex ante (strictly) protable message in the




U r;S = E[U r;Sj m] Pr[ m] = 0:5P: (A.129)
It follows, denoting
 !





















(P (1  ) + c(1  0:5)) > 0; (A.130)




 P 6= 0 (since by
Corollary A.1 bPB0 = F( m)(P c) which is bounded from 0).
Thus, there exists F > 0 within () such that (F ) > 0 .





so that () is nonempty. Then, there exists
F  2 () such that (F )  0 if F 2 () and F  F  (while (F ) < 0 for some F ),
and (F )  0 if F 2 () and F > F  (while (F ) > 0 for some F ).
Proof. The claim follows jointly from Claims 1-3. In particular, Claim 2 rules out
the rst case listed in Claim 1, while Claim 3 rules out the second case. Hence, the only
possible case is the third case listed in Claim 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. By Lemma 6, the cuto¤s in the pooling equilibrium in each
state are (weakly) lower than in the separating equilibrium. Hence, for a given sender
type 0 in a given state is 2 fB0; N 0g there can be only three possible cases, as listed
below.
Case 1. 0  bPis  bSis . Then, by Lemma 4, 0 would send an investment-inducing
message in both equilibria. He would strictly prefer the separating equilibrium due to a
strictly lower expected guilt, since (em) < 0:5  ( m) by (A.44) and (A.80).
Case 2. bPis < 0  bSis . Then, by Lemma 4, 0 would send an investment-inducing
message in the separating equilibrium (leading to a positive utility) while would obtain
a utility of 0 in the pooling equilibrium. Hence, he would again prefer the separating
equilibrium, with a strict preference if 0 < bSis .
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Case 3. bPis  bSis < 0. Then, by Lemma 4, 0 would get a utility of 0 under both
equilibria.
Finally, all types in state G0 would be indi¤erent between the pooling and the
separating equilibrium, since they always obtain F by Lemma 3.
Thus, the expected utility of each senders type is always (weakly) higher in the
separating equilibrium, and strictly so at least for some types in states B0 and N 0.
A.8 Welfare e¤ects of ex ante information quality
Lemma A.17 In any equilibrium, E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g, where
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bB0

) + (1  )
bN 0

0:5(P + c): (A.131)
Proof. Consider three possible cases depending on the value of the cuto¤s and Pr[Gj?].
Case 1 : bB0 = bN 0 = . Then, the receiver always invests independently of the state
so that
E[U r] = 0:5(P + c) =  jbB0=bN0=,
which also implies E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g.
Case 2 : bB0 < bN 0   and Pr[Gj?]  . Then, the receiver abstains conditional on
?, i.e. the equilibrium is responsive. Consequently,
E[U r] =  > 0:5(P + c)
where the equality is by (A.118), and the inequality is by Lemma A.15(iii). Hence, we
again have E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g.
Case 3 : bB0 < bN 0   and Pr[Gj?] > . Then, the receiver invests conditional on ?,
i.e. the equilibrium is unresponsive so that by Lemma A.15(iii)
E[U r] = 0:5(P + c): (A.132)
Note that Pr[Gj?] >  implies bN 0 <  since otherwise Pr[Gj?] = 0. Then, by (A.99) we
have
Pr[Gj?] = (1  )(   2
bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bPB0
so that
Pr[Gj?] > 
, (1  )(   2
bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bPB0 >
 c
P   c
,  < 0:5(P + c). (A.133)
Then, (A.132) and (A.133) imply E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g
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Thus, we have shown that E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g in all possible cases.
Corollary A.4 In both pooling and separating equilibria, E[U r] and  are continuous in
both F 2 (0;1) and  2 (0; 1).
Proof. By (A.131)  is continuous in  (as a direct argument) and in the cuto¤s bB0(F; )
and bN 0(F; ). At the same time, bB0(F; ) and bN 0(F; ) are continuous in both F and 
by Lemma A.13 and Corollary A.3, hence  is also continuous in both F and . Finally,
since by Lemma A.17 E[U r] is continuous in  , it is also continuous in both F and  .
Proof of Proposition 8.
(i) The pooling equilibrium.
In what follows, we consider function  dened in Lemma A.17:
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bPB0()

) + (1  )
bPN 0()

(0:5P + 0:5c): (A.134)











such that  is strictly decreasing in  on some interval




















Let us consider the following possible cases depending on the possible parameter values.
Case 1: F  0:5(P   c) so that bPN 0 =  and bPB0 =  (by Lemma A.8). Then, by
(A.134)
 = (0:5P + 0:5c) + (1  )(0:5P + 0:5c)
= 0:5P + 0:5c: (A.135)




Case 2: F < 0:5(P   c) and

F > P c








. Then,bPN 0 =  and bPB0 2 (0:5; ) by Lemma A.8.
In this case, by (A.134)
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bPB0




































where the rst equality is by the implicit function theorem, and the second equality is
obtained by substituting for ( mjbPB0) in $(bPB0) (see ( A.33)) and simplifying. Finally,




Case 3: F < P c










. Then,  > bPN 0 = 2bPB0 by
Lemma A.8.






























bPB00 and bPB000. By Lemma A.6, $(bPB0) = 0: Consequently, by the implicit
function theorem bPB00 =   @$(bPB0)=@
@$(bPB0)=@bPB0 : (A.146)
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Substituting and simplifying we obtain
bPB00 =   2
bPB02 (   bPB0)
2
2
+ 4(1  )bPB0 + 2(1  )(4  3)bPB02 < 0: (A.147)

















+ 4(1  )bPB0 + 2(4  7+ 32)(bPB0)2)3Z; (A.149)
where
Z = (P + c)3
4
+ 8(P + c)(1  )23bPB0   2c(4  3)2(1  )(bPB0)4
+2
2
(bPB0)2(10P (1  )2 + c(10  23+ 122))
+8(1  )(2P (1  )2 + c(2  7+ 42))(bPB0)3:
The multiple of Z in (A.149) is clearly positive, hence to show the claim we need to prove
that Z > 0. The rst three terms of Z are clearly positive. For the fourth term we have
(given that P >  c by Assumption 1)
10P (1  )2 + c(10  23+ 122) >  10c(1  )2 + c(10  23+ 122)
=  c (3  2) > 0: (A.150)
Finally, for the fth term we have
2P (1  )2 + c(2  7+ 42) >  2c(1  )2 + c(2  7+ 42)
=  c (3  2) > 0: (A.151)


























P 2 + 2c(P   c)): (A.154)
Consider rst the case of  = 0 which, by (A.153), occurs if and only if F 
0:25(P   c): By Corollary A.1 and bPB0 <  by assumption,




bPB0 = Flim!0 ( m)(P   c) : (A.156)
At the same time, since bPN 0 = 2bPB0 in the considered case, by (A.29)
( mjbPB0) = 2bPB0(1  ) + bPB0(4  3) +  : (A.157)
Since bPB0 is bounded from 0 by (A.155) (and hence the limit of the denominator is not
equal to 0), by (A.157) we obtain
lim
!0
( mjbPB0) = 2 lim!0 bPB0
4 lim!0 bPB0 = 0:5: (A.158)
This together with (A.156) implies
lim
!
bPB0 = 2FP   c: (A.159)




bPB00 = F2(P   c)   4 : (A.160)
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P   (2P + c) 2F








(P   c)2   2F (3P + c)
4(P   c)
: (A.161)
It follows that lim!
d 
d










; 0:25(P   c)

, which is nonempty if P >  3c:
Consider the remaining case  6= 0, i.e.  = 4F (P c)
F
> 0 (see (A.153)). Note that





where the last equality follows from (A.43) and the equilibrium condition $(bPB0) = 0.
Consequently, since bPB0() is continuous in  by Lemma A.13, it follows
lim
!
bPB0() = bPB0() = 0:5: (A.162)
Substituting this into (A.147) we obtain
lim
!
bPB00 = F 2
2(5F(P   c)  (P   c)22   8F 2)
(A.163)





=  (P   c)(6F
2   c(P   c)2   2F(P   2c))
4(5F(P   c)  (P   c)22   8F 2)
:
One can show that this expression is strictly negative in the considered case (i.e. under
the restriction F > 0:25(P   c)) if and only if
F 2

0:25(P   c); 1
6
( 2c + P + 
p
P 2 + 2cP   2c2)

This interval is nonempty if and only if P >  3c.
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( 2c + P + 
p
P 2 + 2cP   2c2)

; (A.164)
with the interval being nonempty if and only if P >  3c:






From (A.147) we have
lim
!1
bPB00 =  2(   bPB0)(bPB0)22 : (A.166)








(   2bPB0)  cbPB0( + 2bPB0(   bPB0))
2
3 > 0; (A.167)
where the inequality is by  > 2bPB0 by assumption.
The results (A.143), (A.164) and (A.165) imply that if the condition on F in (A.164)






























. If condition (A.164) is violated, then (A.143) and (A.165)










(if it is nonempty).
Finally, note that  is continuous in  by Lemma A.4. This together with the results
of Cases 1-3 implies that  strictly decreases in  on some interval K if and only if any
 2 K satises conditions given in Claim 1.























Proof. By Lemma A.17 we have
E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g: (A.168)
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Hence, given continuity of  by Lemma A.13, E[U r] strictly decreases in  on some
interval K if and only if  strictly decreases in  on this interval while  > 0:5(P + c) for





















Let us show the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (A.170). Consider the following
two cases depending on whether  = 0 .
Case 1.  = 0.
Note that in this case for any  2 (0; 1) it holds
 > 0  4F  
(P   c)
F
) F < P   c
4   :
Then, by Lemma A.8 we have bPB0 2 (0; 0:5) and bPN 0 = 2bPB0 for any  2 (0; 1). Moreover,
 = 0, 4F (P c)
F
 0 implies







lim!0 ( mjbPB0)(P   c) =
F
0:5(P   c) 
P c
4
0:5(P   c) = 0:5
; (A.173)
where the rst equality is by (A.92), the second equality is by (A.158), and the inequality

















(0:5P + 0:5c)  0:5P + 0:5c, (A.174)
where the inequality is due to lim!0 bPB0  0:5 by (A.173).
Hence, the condition (A.170) is not satised if  = 0.
Case 2.  6= 0,  = (4F   (P   c))=F > 0.
Note that in the considered case for any  >  we have
 >
4F   (P   c)
F
, F < P   c
4   ;
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so that by Lemma A.8 we again have bPB0 2 (0; 0:5) and bPN 0 = 2bPB0. Consequently, by
(A.99)
(?jbPB0) = (1  )(   2bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3)bPB0 : (A.175)
At the same time, in the considered case
lim
!+
bPB0 = bPB0j= = 0:5; (A.176)
where the rst equality is by the continuity of bPB0 in  on (0; 1) by Lemma A.13, and the
second equality is by Lemma A.4 and the fact that $(0:5) = 0 for  = (4F (P c))=F
(see (A.43)). Then, we obtain
lim
!+
(?jbPB0) = (1  )(   2 lim! bPB0)
(2  )   (4  3) lim! bPB0
=
(1  )(   )
(2  )   (4  3)0:5
= 0 < ,
where the rst equality is by (A.175) and the fact that the denominator is not equal
to 0 since  > 0 by assumption, and the second equality is by (A.176). Consequently,
for  su¢ ciently close to  it should also hold (?jbPB0) <  (given that bPB0, and hence
(?jbPB0), is continuous in  by Lemma A.13), i.e. the receiver will not invest conditional
on ? so that the equilibrium is responsive. For such values of  it would then hold
 > 0:5(P + c) by Lemma A.15(iii) and (A.168). Hence, the condition (A.170) is always
satised if  = (4F   (P   c))=F .
Combining Cases 1 and 2 together implies that (A.170) is satised if and only if
 = (4F   (P   c))=F , which is equivalent to
F > 0:25(P   c): (A.177)







with some   0 such that  strictly decreases in 
while  > 0:5(P+c) for any  on this interval (and these both conditions would never hold
simultaneously for any other ). This would in turn imply by (A.168) that E[U r] strictly










0:25(P   c); 1
6
( 2c + P + 
p






< 0:25(P   c) if the interval in (A.164) is nonempty. Note that there
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exist parameter values such that the interval in (A.178) is nonempty, in particular this is
the case if and only if P >  3c. This leads to part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) The separating equilibrium.
Claim 1. In the separating equilibrium,  strictly decreases in  on some interval K















































Case 1: blN 0 =  and blB0 =  so that F  (1 )(P c)2  (by Lemma A.11). Then, by
(A.134)
 = (0:5P + 0:5c) + (1  )(0:5P + 0:5c)
= 0:5P + 0:5c: (A.179)




Case 2: bSN 0 =  and bSB0 2 (0:5; ) so that F 2 (1 )(P c)4 3 ; (1 )(P c)2   (by Lemma
A.11). Then, by (A.134)
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bSB0
























As in the previous case, by the implicit function theorem






where the last equality is obtained substituting (A.62) for (mN 0jbSB0) in the expression












Let us nd bSB0. Solving the indi¤erence condition
(bSB0) = F   bSB0(mN 0jbSB0)(P   c) = F   bSB0 (1  )
bSB0 + 2(1  )(P   c) = 0 (A.187)
yields bSB0 = 2F (1  )(P   c)(1  )   F: (A.188)





2(F  (P   c)(1  ))2
(a1
2
+ a2 + a3); (A.189)
where
a1 = ((P   c)(1  ))2 ;
a2 =  2(P   c)F (1  );
a3 =  F 22:
Since the fraction in (A.189) is strictly positive, d 
d
< 0 if and only if a1
2
+ a2 + a3 < 0













(P   c)(1  ) , F >





One can show that the RHS of (A.191) is smaller than the upper bound of F in Case 2:





(1  )(P   c)
2   : (A.192)




depending on the parameters. Consequently, d 
d


















Case 3:  > bSN 0 = 2bSB0 so that F < (1 )(P c)4 3 (by Lemma A.11). Then, by (A.134)
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bSB0

) + (1  )2
bSB0





















c(2  ) + 2P (1  )
2
 0; (A.197)
with the latter inequality by   2(P+c)
2P+c
(a necessary condition for the separating
equilibrium by Proposition 4). Finally, by the implicit function theorem and the fact
that (bSB0) = 0 by Lemma A.9,
bSB00 =   @(bSB0)=@
@(bSB0)=@bSB0 : (A.198)





4(1  )2 + (1  ) > 0: (A.199)




Finally, note that  is continuous in  by Lemma A.4. This together with the results
of Cases 1-3 implies that  strictly decreases in  on some interval K if and only if for



















Combining this condition with the existence condition for the separating equilibrium
from Proposition 4, we obtain that  strictly decreases in  on some interval K (while

















































Note that the rst interval of F is always nonempty, while the second interval of F is







, in particular, whenever  c is su¢ ciently small relative
to P . Altogether, this leads to Claim 1.
Claim 2. In the separating equilibrium, E[U r] strictly decreases in  on some interval
K if and only if  strictly decreases in  on K .
Proof. Let us rst show necessity. By Lemma A.17 we have
E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g: (A.202)
Besides,  is continuous in  by Lemma A.4. Hence, E[U r] strictly decreases in  on some
interval K only if  strictly decreases in  on K.
Let us show su¢ ciency. Assume  strictly decreases in  on some interval K. By the
proof of Claim 1 this can only be the case if condition (A.193) holds for any  2 K, which
implies by Lemma A.15(ii) that the equilibrium is responsive for any  2 K. Then, by
Lemma A.15(iii) it holds E[U r] > 0:5(P + c) for any  2 K, which implies by (A.202)
that E[U r] =  for any  2 K. Consequently, since  strictly decreases in  on K, E[U r]
should decrease in  on this interval as well.
Claims 1 and 2 together lead to part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 9. Note that generally, the expected utility of type  before his




(U sis(; ( m); I) Pr[ mjis; ] Pr[is])
= 0:5F + 0:5Pr[ mjB0; ](F   ( m)(P   c))
+(1  ) Pr[ mjN 0; ](F   0:5( m)(P   c)): (A.203)
Next, consider separately the pooling and the separating equilibrium.
(i) The pooling equilibrium.
Claim 1. In the pooling equilibrium, if F  0:5(P  c), then the sender is indi¤erent
over his probability of being informed.
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Proof. If F  0:5(P c), then by Lemma A.8 we have bPB0 = bPN 0 = , so that all types
send message m. At the same time, it is easy to verify that ( m)jbPB0=bPN0= = 0:5. After
substituting this together with Pr[ mjB0; ] = Pr[ mjN 0; ] = 1 into (A.203) we obtain
E[U s()] = F   0:25(P   c);
which does not depend on . Hence, the claim follows.
Claim 2. If F < 0:5(P   c), then bPB0 strictly decreases with .
Proof. If F < 0:5(P   c), we have bPB0 <  by Lemma A.8. Then, by (A.141) and
(A.147) @bPB0=@ < 0 (where bPB0 is di¤erentiable). Consequently, since bPB0 is continuous
in  by Lemma A.13 (and di¤erentiable everywhere except for a nite set of kink points),bPB0 strictly decreases with .
Claim 3. If F < 0:5(P   c), then ( mjbPB0) strictly increases with .
Proof. If F < 0:5(P   c), we have bPB0 <  by Lemma A.8. Then, by Corollary A.1
it holds
( mjbPB0) = FbPB0(P   c) : (A.204)
This together with Claim 2 implies that ( mjbPB0) strictly increases with .
Claim 4. In the pooling equilibrium, if F < 0:5(P   c), then the senders expected
utility strictly decreases with  on (0; 1) if  <  where  > 0 is some threshold
independent of .
Proof. Note that F < 0:5(P c) implies bPB0() < bPN 0() for any  2 (0; 1) by Lemma
A.8. Assume further that the senders type  is su¢ ciently low so that  < bPB0() < bPN 0()
holds for any  2 (0; 1) (note that bPB0() is bounded from 0 for any  by Corollary A.1).
In turn, this implies that the sender sends message m in all information states so that
Pr[ mjB0; ] = Pr[ mjN 0; ] = 1. After substituting this into (A.203) we obtain
E[U s()] = F   0:5( m)(P   c) (A.205)
for any  2 (0; 1). Then, given that the equilibrium level of ( m) strictly increases with
 by Claim 3, the claim follows.
Claim 5. If F < 0:5(P   c), then bPB0() is bounded from  for any  2 (0; 1).
Proof. From (A.91) we obtain lim!0 ( m) = 0:5 (given that the limit of the
denominator is not 0 since bPB0 is bounded from 0). Then, by Corollary A.1
lim
!0
bPB0() = Flim!0 ( m)(P   c) = F0:5(P   c) < ; (A.206)
where the inequality is due to F < 0:5(P   c) by assumption. From ( A.206) and the
fact that bPB0() is decreasing in  by Claim 2 it follows that bPB0() is bounded from  for
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any  2 (0; 1).
Claim 6. In the pooling equilibrium, if F < 0:5(P   c), then the senders expected
utility strictly increases with  on (0; 1) for any  > e , where e <  is some threshold
independent of .
Proof. Assume that the senders type  is su¢ ciently high so that bPB0() <  < 
holds for any  2 (0; 1) (which is possible by Claim 5). This implies that the sender does
not send message m in state B0 so that Pr[ mjB0; ] = 0. Note that Pr[ mjN 0; ] = 1, i.e.
the sender induces investment while being uninformed, if and only if his expected utility
from investment in state N 0 is positive, i.e. if and only if F 0:5( m)(P c)  0. Denote
the senders expected utility conditional on investment in state N 0 as
N 0() = U
s
N 0(




0:5F + (1  )N 0() if N 0()  0;
0:5F if N 0() < 0:
(A.208)







 B0()  (1  )(P   c)@( m)@

if N 0()  0;
0:5F if N 0() < 0:
(A.209)
Clearly, E[U s()] is strictly increasing in  on (0; 1) in the second case. Let us also show
that E[U s()] is increasing in  for  2 (0; 1) in the rst case, i.e. if N 0()  0, if  is
su¢ ciently high. Note that in this case we must have   bPN 0 (since type  invests in
state N 0) so that bPB0  0:5bPN 0  0:5; (A.210)
where the rst inequality is by Lemma A.5. Next, by (A.91),
( mjbPB0) =
8<:










Consider these two cases separately (excluding  = 4F 
(P c)
F
, where ( mjbPB0) is
continuous but not di¤erentiable in ).
Case 1:  < 4F 
(P c)
F
, F < P c
4  . Then, we have
bPB0 < 0:5 by Lemma A.8.
Together with (A.210), this implies
bPB0 2 [0:5; 0:5): (A.212)
Substituting the corresponding expression for ( mjbPB0) from (A.211) into (A.208) (under
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assumption N 0()  0) and di¤erentiating with respect to  (while using (A.147) for
@bPB0
@







(4  )2   0:5F > 0; (A.213)
where the inequality follows from F < P c
4  by assumption. Moreover, this expression is
bounded from 0 for F < P c
4  . Hence, there must exist 








with respect to  may converge to positive innity. Yet, this is excluded by
(A.209) given that B0() is bounded and
@( m)
@
> 0 by Claim 3.









(given the initial restriction of
Claim 6).
Then, we have bPB0 2 (0:5; ) by Lemma A.8. Note that in this case the equilibrium
condition $(bPB0) = 0 yields a closed-form solution for bPB0:
bPB0 = F(2  )(P   c)  F: (A.214)
Substituting this together with the corresponding expression for ( mjbPB0) from (A.211)
into (A.208 ) (under assumption N 0()  0) and di¤erentiating with respect to , and






(P   c)22   2F 2(1  )  F (2  + 2)(P   c)
2(2  )2(P   c)
;
which can be shown to be always strictly positive for F < 0:5(P   c). Moreover, by
the same argument as in Case 1, there must exist 00 <  (independent of ) such that
dE[Us()]
d
> 0 for any  > 00 and any  in the considered case.
In sum, Cases 1 and 2 imply that there exists e <  independent of  such that
dE[Us()]
d




> 0 for any  2 (0; 1) as far as N 0() < 0 by (A.209), we obtain that
dE[Us()]
d
> 0 for any  > e and any  2 (0; 1) whenever this derivative exists.
Finally, note that ( m) is continuous in  by (A.204) and the fact that bPB0 is continuous
in  by Lemma A.13. Consequently, by (A.208 ), E[U s()] is also continuous in .
Given that E[U s()] is also di¤erentiable in  except on a nite set of kink points, while
dE[Us()]
d
> 0 for any  > e and  2 (0; 1) where di¤erentiable (as shown above), Claim 6
follows.
Part (i) of the proposition jointly follows from Claims 1, 4 and 6.
(ii) The separating equilibrium.
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Claim 7. bSB0 weakly increases with , and strictly so if and only if bSB0 < .
Proof. Consider the separating equilibrium under di¤erent values of F . If F 
(1 )(P c)
2  , then by Lemma A.11
bSB0 =  so that @bSB0=@ = 0. If F < (1 )(P c)2  =)bSB0 <  (by Lemma A.8), then by ( A.185) and (A.199) @bSB0=@ > 0 (where bSB0
is di¤erentiable). Consequently, since bSB0 is continuous in  by Lemma A.13 (and
di¤erentiable everywhere except on a nite set of kink points), bSB0 weakly increases with
, and strictly so if and only if bSB0 < .
Claim 8. (emjbSB0) is continuous in .
Proof. By Lemma 5, (emjbSB0) is generally given by
(emjbSB0) = Pr[emjG0]+ Pr[emjN 0](1  )(Pr[emjG0] + Pr[emjB0])+ 2Pr[emjN 0](1  )
=




; 2bSB0o (1  )bSB0+ 2minn; 2bSB0o (1  ) ; (A.215)
where the last equality is by Lemma A.5. Hence, (emjbSB0) is continuous in bSB0. At the
same time, bSB0 is continuous in  by Lemma A.13, which leads to the claim.
Claim 9. (emjbSB0) strictly decreases with .
Proof. Note that by Corollary A.2 it holds in the separating equilibrium
(emjbSB0) =
8<:
FbSB0 (P c) if bSB0 < ;
(emj) = 1 
2  if
bSB0 = : (A.216)
Note that both functions strictly decrease with  (with the rst one by Claim 7). At the
same time, (emjbSB0) must be continuous in  by Claim 8. Note also that bSB0 is monotonic
in  by Claim 7. Hence, (emjbSB0) strictly decreases with .
Claim 10. In the separating equilibrium, the senders expected utility strictly increases
with  for any .
Proof. Denote again the senders expected utility conditional on investment in state




bSB0 ; (emjbSB0); I) = F   Pr[Bjis](emjbSB0)(P   c): (A.217)
By incentive compatibility, Pr[emjB0] = 1 if and only if B0()  0, while Pr[emjN 0] = 1 if
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and only if N 0()  0. Then by (A.203),
E[U s()] =
8><>:
0:5F + 0:5B0() + (1  )N 0() if B0()  0;
0:5F + (1  )N 0() if B0() < 0 ^ N 0()  0;
0:5F if N 0() < 0:
(A.218)








+ (1  )@N0 ()
@
if B0()  0;
 0:5B0() + (1  )@N0 ()@ if B0() < 0 ^ N 0()  0;
0:5F if N 0() < 0:
(A.219)
Note that  0:5B0() in the second case is positive given that B0() < 0 in this case. At




=  Pr[Bjis](P   c)@(emjbSB0)
@
> 0,
where the inequality is by Claim 9. Thus, by (A.219), @E[U
s()]
@
> 0 (where it is
di¤erentiable) in all cases. This together with the fact that E[U s()] is continuous in
 since (emjbSB0) is continuous in  by Claim 8 (while E[U s()] is also di¤erentiable in 
except on a nite set of kink points), implies that E[U s()] is strictly increasing in .
Part (ii) of the proposition follows from Claim 10.
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider the game under outcome-based preferences.
Without loss of generality, we consider the pooling equilibrium (recall that all other
equilibria are payo¤-equivalent by Proposition 1).
Claim 1. If an equilibrium is unresponsive, then the receiver obtains an expected
payo¤ of 0:5(P + c). Any responsive equilibrium yields a strictly higher expected payo¤.
Proof. The proof follows by the same arguments as the proof of Lemma A.15(iii).
Claim 2. In any equilibrium, E[U r] = maxf ; 0:5(P + c)g, where
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bB0





Proof. The proof follows by the same arguments as the proof of Lemma A.17 given
Claim 1.
Claim 3.  continuously increases in  .
Proof. We have
 = (0:5P + 0:5c
bB0

) + (1  )
bN 0

(0:5P + 0:5c) (A.220)
= (0:5P + 0:5c
minf; F=g

) + (1  )minf
; 2F=g

(0:5P + 0:5c); (A.221)
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(P (  minf; 2F=g)  c(minf; 2F=g  minf; F=g))  0. (A.222)
Claim 4. E[U r] is non-decreasing in  .
Proof. The result follows directly from Claims 2 and 3.
Claim 5. E[U s] is non-decreasing in .




(U sis(; ( m); I) Pr[ mjis; ] Pr[is])
= 0:5F + 0:5Pr[ mjB0; ](F   )




is(; I) = F   Pr[Bjis]; (A.224)
analogously to (A.218) we obtain
E[U s()] =
8><>:
0:5F + 0:5B0() + (1  )N 0() if B0()  0;
0:5F + (1  )N 0() if B0() < 0 ^ N 0()  0;
0:5F if N 0() < 0:
(A.225)





0 if B0()  0;
 0:5B0() if B0() < 0 ^ N 0()  0;
0:5F if N 0() < 0:
(A.226)
Note that in the second case  0:5B0() > 0 since B0() < 0 in that case. Thus,
@E[Us()]
@
 0 in all cases.
The statement of the proposition follows from Claims 4 and 5.
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